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Abstract
This study examines metaphoric expression as an innovative phenomenon in
the creative process and explor.es theO!i_~s_~f_ metap~or as a model for
changing our perceptions of reality. Innovation is taken to be the creation and
extension of meaning via metaphoric reference and projection, an imaginative
-----------"----------- ------_.--- -_. _~~- _~ ----
str~Lct~rimLOf~~!i~f!~ !h,at !:.E!!l1v~nt~ealit and esents it as~ fiC!ion~
While fiction refers to those worlds made in the creative act of producing works
of art, worlds refer to both the exterior manifestations of works, as well as the
interior world as a source of symbolic worlds.
This study thus explores metaphoric reference and projection as a means by
which we understand and figuratively express experience and the role
metaphor plays in the creative strategies of my own practice as a visual artist
and those of the contemporary British artist Tony Cragg.
In my own recent working practice, in relation to the innovative role of
metaphor, the notion of psychic or metaphorical disruption is explored. This is
understood as a suspension of logical or literal reference to reality and as the
condition for a metaphoric or analogical response to experience. This form of
disengagement brought about by psychological and emotional upheaval,
allows me to disembark from dominant conceptual and emotional frameworks
and corresponds to the semantic openings brought about by metaphoric
reference and interpretation. These disruptions manifest themselves as
primitive iconic conditions that provide routes in the creative process
conducive to discovery, restructuring and invention. In my work this is
principally achieved by the activity of drawing. I describe drawing as a mythic
activity of attempting to close the gap on an elusive empirical world and as a
means of making new worlds. Interpretation or reading the drawings, their
surfaces and calligraphic marks, is' also part of the lyrical process of making
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fidions, metaphorical digressions and progressions towards deciphering and
re-organising worlds. These worlds are both virtual and material spaces. In
all the work, what appears to be disruptive or discordant brings about the
condition for renewal and reorientation in the world.
The \YOrk of Tony Cragg (b.1949) is discussed as an example of contemporary
art pradice where metaphor is evident as a model for changing perceptions.
Early in his career Cragg explored scientific models of investigation, as
explanatory means for understanding the world. His work refleds an
endeavour to 'humanise' these scientific models by making images that
fundion as alternative and complementary 'thinking models' (Cragg in Celant
:172). His working process is understood as an attempt to construct a novel
referential scheme for our encounters with the physical \YOrld of objeds both
natural and manufadured. His sculptures are thus interpreted as visual
manifestations of metaphorical disruption and innovation. Often made from
discarded waste, his sculptures emerge from the material ruin of a prior
physical order, and an evolving mental order. In both instances, physically
and conceptually, they carry traces of former selves, with the potential to
.extend into something new.
As a loose framevvork for this discussion, certain theories of mind and
metaphor that provide some insights into my own \YOrking pradice and what I
perceive to be those of Tony Cragg, are briefly examined. Principally, these
include the theory of metaphor of the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, but also some
more general views concerning cognition and imagination. These include the
early theories of Giambattista Vico concerning the creative role of the
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When we ask whether metaphorical language reaches reality, we
presuppose that we already know what reality is. But if we assume
that metaphor redescribes reality, we must then assume that this
reality, as redescribed, is itself novel reality.
Paul Ricouer (1973: 85)
This study examines the means by which metaphor contributes to innovation,
meaning and renewal in my own \NOrking practice and in the \NOrk of the
contemporary artist Tony Cragg (b.1949).
I draw selectively on some models and theories of metaphor pertinent to its
cognitive and creative means and symbolic and material manifestations, in an
endeavour to gain insight into the creative strategies of the abovementioned
visual artists.
Of the various claims that have been made both for and against the cognitive
value and creative capacities of metaphor1, the claim made for its '\NOrld
making' role in poetic language, and in other non-linguistic forms of symbolic
expression, and by extension its ability to 'reorganise'and change our
experience of reality, is of particular interest to this study2. For metaphor, as a
component of poetic language, to carry such ontological weight may
overestimate its capabilities. However, current research and writings on
metapho! give plausibility to the theC?'!y_tb~tJ!._is _~.Q~E.Q.Iy-..~n~mbelli~hing
ling~i~t~..c:>r artistic trope, !t is a deftning.J!haracteristic r~sponsible for
co~~ptu~l_ ~~~u~ht,.. ~n~ other displays of meaning .and. understanding
(Johnson 1987; Danesi 1993).
1 Since Plato and Aristotle this debate has continued up to the present, usually in rhetorical theory (in the
study d figures) and in debates concerning language as a representative medium.
2 'world making' is a term Paul Ric:oeur takes from Nelson Goodman's work on symbolic systems,
Languages ofM.
2
The idea that metaphor structures thought and language is no longer a r:'e~_
--- ----- - -- - -
ol)_~, butJh~.J!!lJ>li_cati~~s of this have _gi~en_rise to a number of t~eories
concerning the kind of role that metaphor plays in our processes of
understan~lng and i~_ ~ur _way of~~~un~~ and rep~~~~ti"-g_~~ur __~~~erience
of the ~rld, that is, making sense and meaning of it. For the artists discussed
- ~ -- - - - - _. - ------._--~
in this study, metaphor enables a recasting of their experience and
understanding of the \YOrld and an experience of renewal through making art.
The following discussion of some of these theories of metaphor provides an
interesting perspective on their \YOrk and on how their practice enables a
radical reorganising of their \YOrlds. It is not in any way intended that these
theories be presented as a fixed frame\YOrk through which to critically analyse
the \YOrk, but rather that they provide speculative ways of reading and
understanding the \YOrk.
In view of the role language and other symbolic systems have in shaping our
world, and the inherent gap between signs and things signified, metaphorical
reference can reinstate a connection with our experience of being in the \YOrld.
The nature of this restitution, at least in the nature of the examples of art I
discuss, is not mimetic in the sense of re-presenting an image or illusion of a
lost or absent reality. It is an endeavour that continually, in the philosopher
Nelson Goodman's terms, 'reorganises the world in terms of \YOrks and \YOrks
in terms of worlds' (Goodman in Ricoeur 1979 : 117).
'Reorganising' the \YOrld involves both m!lkers an~_~.~~ience in a complex
relationship with the fictive world of texts/works3 , and the symbolic, figurative
_.__._---
m~~ns devised in the effort to close the gap on the temporality of the \YOrld of
-- -- - -~----_.- ._~-'-----_. - -- - ._.__.,,_.__._--..- -"-'-_.'--" -
OUL cjrcumstantiC!l~nd physical experience. The philosopher Paul Ricoeur
------- ~ - ---- -
_terms it 'aesthetical grasping of the \YOrld' through symbolic systems, fictions,
3 '~rks' refers to the products cl symbolic systems verbal or visual, (writing a poem, making a drawing,
writing a story).
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that refer to reality in unique ~ys in order to reinvent~(~!~ur 1979 : 117).
For Ricoeur it is the exem lar of met horical attribution in poetic discourse, -- ~--_.- -_.- ----- ----
that allows a suspension of our 'ordinary' received vision, and, by presenting
" ~--------- .- ------
itself as a display of imag~s, e~bles us to project a n~ vi~i?n. _I~ .!'lis 'NI"itings
he presents a theory of metaphorical reference within poetic discourse, as a
model for changing the way we present our experience of the world to others.
Wlt~in_th_~~ ~~eo!y h~--!:.econsiders the role of imagination and the nat~re of ~e
image in perception and in metaphor. It is the nature of this endeavour that is
relevant to a discussion of the creative processes of the above-mentioned
visual artists, and which forms the focus of this study.
In Chapter Four I give an account of the sculptor Tony Cragg's approach to his
work and his view of his role as an artist. Cragg's aesthetic strategies - to
achieve new insight, to establish new criteria by which we can re-envision the
world of objects, natural and manmade - can be seen to correspond to the
strategies of metaphor in Ricoeur's theory. Sculpture is the chosen
investigative medium that allows speculation and renewed vision. Cragg
states his interests as an artist as survivalist, achieved through poetic
invention, and allied to the pursuits of scientific investigation. He takes on the
responsibility of contributing to an understanding of the world and bringing
about changes in human life (Cragg in Celant 1996 : 118). Furthermore, he
believes the work of the artist/philosopher is to humanise scientific theoretical
models of the world by making images as poetical 'thinking models' (Cragg in
Celant 1996 : 172). These interests are reflected in his description of the
artist's role as a combination of objectivity, subjectivity and irrationality (Cragg
in Celant 1996 : 118). These three levels of engagement with the world are
built into his aesthetic strategy. This involves 'firstorder' empirical experience
of the world, the physical intervention in exploring the nature of the material
world, and what the artist terms an 'erotic appreciation' of the material world as
a 'celebration of life' (Cragg in Celant 1996 : 62, 118). Making sculpture
ultimately results in a new referential scheme for engaging with the world. In
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his attempts to understand the world and his place in it, he re-models it, and in
the process, our understanding of our place in the world.
In the final chapter of this study I discuss my own working practice and
aesthetic strategies, finding parallels with, and gaining insight from some of
Giambattista Vico's theories of precognitive poetic logic and Ricoeur's
suspension of descriptive reference in metaphor. As with Cragg's approach,
the starting point for the work is a need to dispense with categories of
understanding and conceptual models in order to renew a connection with the
world. The experience and activity of drawing is a process of reconnection.
The initial phase, prior to my making artworks, is characterised by a
withdrawal or suspension from direct or empirical engagement with things and
with the engendering of an interior world. I attempt to account for sources in
my work via an exploration of cognitive and psychic disruption, as the
condition for renewal, 'Nhether this results from metaphoric attribution as a
process of suspension, or as a form of recategorising and remodelling
concepts. The process described is a path from dis-engagement as a
primitive 'iconic' state to the invention of a visual language that reinvents and
reconnects with reality through fiction.
The literal and conceptual interpretative progressions and digressions towards
an image or recognition of an object, inherent in the drawing activity, I regard
as a metaphorical path towards a reconnection with the world of physical and
temporal experience. The catalyst for a reconfigured experience is
preconceptual engagement, a breaking of the threads of a prior connection
provided by rational thought categories and language. Renewal is made
possible in the manipulation and deciphering of graphic marks that make up
the surfaces of drawings. The resulting images are analogical surfaces,
metaphorical maps, tracing and plotting states of physical, emotional and
conceptual understanding, states that become the visible shape of fictive
symbolic worlds.
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Metaphors lie at the heart of the constant struggle against the limitations and
inadequacies of language and other symbolic expression as the link with
reality. This occurs whether the desire is for compatibility between expression
and an objective world, or, for expression that transcends any so-called
compatibility with a so-called objective world.
An account of metaphor is essentially connect~d .to an ~ccount of meaning
~nd understanding in expression-,-..and tl'!.ese_ in turn are relat~d to ways of
constructing and presef!ling e~ri~nce symbolically, or to use Ricoeur's
tenns, -,r~~ching reality' iRicoeur 1979 : 1.17). Metaphor can generally be
characterised as both a disruptive and a constructive phenomenon in thought
--- -.- ------- - --. - . - - - ----
and its linguistic and visual expression, and it is in this paradoxical sense that
it is creative.
Before embarking further on a discussion of models of metaphor, it might be
useful to point out some important and helpful distinctions concerning the
study of metaphor itself (Gibbs 1999 : 36 - 41). Most accounts or theories of
metaphor have situated it at the manifest stage of figurative artefacts, as
expressions in language or visual art, the level at which they· enter cultural
discourse. Not many accounts have recognised the role of metaphor at the
level of the formation of schematic mental projections (Gibbs 1999; Johnson
1987). To an extent this is the reason why metaphor has not always been
taken seriously in cognitive theory.
A distinction can be drawn between the processes of metaphor, Of, how 'Ne
produce and understand metaphor in language (or images), and the products
of metaphor, that is, the meanings 'Ne infer from understanding or interpreting
an example of metaphor. Both of these require different theoretical
descriptions. The first can be explained as a mental capacity or as a cognitive
conceptualising function, which gives rise to linguistic tropes in various forms
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of expression. The second has to do with metaphoric reference in language,
as a type of representation that becomes part of cultural discourse.
A distinction is also made between 'metaphoric processing' and 'processing
metaphoric language'. Metaphoric processing is a way of understanding or
interpreting any situation, text or object, not necessarily specifically designated
as metaphorical. It can be seen, then, as a particular approach to perceiving
I or reading the world and its objects, including cultural objects, which can result
in a metaphorical interpretation of the material. This modus operandi or
cognitive strategy, in the absence of obvious metaphorical tropes, can also be
described as a articular way of making sense of what we experience4. This
can be, more broadly termed, poetic understanding or cognition, and may lead
to metaphorical expression and statements in the form of poetic texts, images,
concepts and so forth.
The processing of metaphoric language, however, is prompted by more
explicit cues, in the form of figurative tropes, in statements in language, or in
images, which lead directly to metaphoric or poetic readings or construels.
This becomes even more obvious if it is recognised that a work falls into a
specific genre category where one would expect to find these, for instance
works of poetry or allegory. This kind of processing of metaphoric statements
incorporates various interpretative strategies, broadly, as attempts to extract
meaning from such works or statements, or more specifically, as a strategy of
literary or aesthetic criticism and analysis.
The bearers of metaphor can be non-linguistic. A metaphorical concept, as a
product of mind, can present itself in non-linguistic forms, as sounds, images,
objects, rituals and so forth. These different manifestations of metaphor may
4 Claude L6vi-Strauss refers to a cognitive strategy et this kind as the logic of the bricoleur, using the
tenn bricolage to describe this analogical way et responding and interpreting the world via metaphorical
relationships which are improvised conceptual structures to understand reality. (L6vi-Strauss 1966 :
263). Chapter 1 cl this study describes Giambattisto Vico's notion cl 'poetic logic' which has similarities
to Levi-Strauss's notion et analogical thought.
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require different strategies for their identification. For the purposes of this
paper I contend that, characterised as metaphoric, they are all symbolic
artefacts presenting analogical structure and encouraging metaphorical or
imaginative insight. The processes of metaphor and its products, and the
metaphoric processing or interpreting of experience are consequently
important to this study.
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CHAPTER 1
Cognition: Imagination and Image.
Imagination is not, as its etymology would suggest, the faculty of
forming images of reality; it is rather the faculty of forming images
which go beyond reality, which sing reality. Bachelard (Cited in
Gaudin 1971 : 15)
Until recently, metaphor has traditionally been studied as a linguistic
phenomenon, and approaches to it have been concerned with the relations
between language and reality and the value and necessity of metaphoric
meaning in our linguistic accounts of reality, particularly the nature of
reference in expression. Conceptions of language and thought have
traditionally rejected metaphor on the grounds of its association with emotion,
ambiguity, and aesthetic value, that is, the intervention of human subjectivity,
rather than what is perceived to be objective cognitive value. If metaphor is
acceptable only as an aesthetic enhancement to expression, and is confined
to poetic language which in turn is relegated to the realm of the superfluous
and fanciful, then it cannot have any lasting cognitive significance.
Furthermore, metaphor, as responsible for the display of images in language
which are not traditionally associated with semantics in expression or with
conceptual thought, is regarded as a manifestation of 'psychological' features
of perception and cognition (Ricoeur 1979 :123). Therefore metaphor cannot
contribute to essential knowledge of the world, assuming of course that such
knowledge is possible.
Although metaphor is studied most commonly as figurative language, it also
has a long history in philosophical debates about the nature and purpose of
language and communication extending back to Plato (428 - 348 B. C.) and
Aristotle (384 - 322 B. C.). These attitudes towards language have changed
metaphor's status in philosophy throughout its history. This status is always
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allied to changing attitudes towards the representational aspects of language,
its relationship to the 'NOrld.
The prejudice against metaphor in philosophical and scientific epistemological
debate, reflects persistent dichotomous attitudes to the nature of meaning and
our means of expressing it. Broadly, these dichotomies5 consist of
assumptions associated with the rationalist/objectivist6 tradition in philosophy
that has oriented Western culture, in opposition to certain views of cognition
that have valued imaginative structures of human understanding and
expression. This tradition culminated in the Cartesian view of the existence of
a transcendent mentality, able to give a rational account of an objective reality,
via arbitrary abstract symbols and concepts, unimpeded by imagination and
SUbjectivity. Although now seriously challenged, this view is still pervasive in
most accounts of relations between thought, language and reality and its
representation (Kittay 1987; Johnson 1987). Metaphor is regarded by this
rationalist philosophical tradition, as a form of expression that interferes with _
the 'norm,al' op.-eration .of language as..!lQ a~eqL!~t~ m~~ns of des~ribi!,g or
reporting on the nature of an objective 'NOrld.
The opposing account, associated with Romanticism, of meaning as
dependent on context, malleable and subjective, assumes that reality cannot
be reached or given meaningful structure without the imaginative devices
identified as metaphor, metonymy, mental imagery and narrative.
Recently, twentieth century philosophers have begun to take a more serious
interest in the nature of metaphor, particularly in its cognitive role (Danesi
1993; Johnson 1987; Kittay 1987). Moreover, current researchers in
5 Johnson lists these dichotomies as mind/body, reason/imagination, science/art,
cognition/emotion and factlvalue, citing them as influencing the way we understand (Johnson
1987: 140).
6 Richard Bemstein defines these views thus: 'by "objectivism", I mean the basic conviction
that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness,
or rightness.' (Bemstein 1983: 8 cited in Johnson 1987)
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linguistics, and the cognitive and social sciences have made extensive studies
of metaphor and now regard it as a fundamental and necessary feature of our
conceptual capacity and modes of communication and understanding7• A
dramatic shift in cognitive science has also challenged the mindlbody
dichotomy in theories of mind and explored the influence of human experience
and understanding and the nature and effect of our bodily capacities on
cognitive models of perception (Johnson 1987 : xvi). Greater attention is thus
given in the sciences to the notion that 'symbolic behaviour is an extension of
bodily experience' as will be seen in discussions later in this study (Danesi
1993: 34; Johnson 1987 : xiv-xvi).
It is only recently that the study of mind has included, in its focus on rational
and computational skills, investigations into the products of the imagination.
Now, narrative structuring, metaphoric structuring, imagery and myth are
regarded as challenging alternatives to the computational, mechanical models
of thought which separate reason from sense impressions and reinforce the
mindlbody dichotomy. As early as the eighteenth century writers like
Giambattista Vico (1668 -1744) had already developed a theory of mind that
specifically used preconceptual experience expressed in myth and narrative
as sources for understanding language and cognition, in which metaphor plays
a central role. Cognitive scientists and philosophers have increasingly begun
t turning to literature and other cultural products in their inquiries into cognition
and the nature of signs. Credence is now given to the role of imagination and
metaphorical projection and its symbolic manifestations (Johnson 1987 : 139 -
140).
7 The editors (Cameran and Low) to Researching and Applying Metaphor (1999) attest to the
'explosion' of interest in metaphor in the last twenty years. They describe the current status of
studies on metaphor: 'Metaphor in one form or another is fundamental to the way language
systems develop over time and are structured, as well as to the way human beings
consolidate and extend their ideas about themselves, their relationships and their knowledge
of the world. Metaphor is, as a direct consequence; important to psychologists, sociologists,
scientists, humorists, advertising copywriters, poets, literary commentators, philosophers,
historical linguists, semantics researchers... .' (Cameran and Low 1999: xii).
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Theories of symbolic systems that examine how perceptions are organised
and patterned conceptually, have discerned a number of ways in vvhich 'Ne
express the relationships and connections 'Ne perceive through our senses,
forming the basis of meaning.
Of significance to this discussion, is the symbolically projected kind of
- ----_~_. _._~ -- -- --
perception (one thing 'standing in for' something else) because it involves
images and therefore, relates to metaphor. Charles S. Pierce distinguished
three types of symbolic perception, the icon, the index and the symbol each of
vvhich are applied depending on the 'degree of similarity between the sign and
its referent' (Polkinghorne 1988 : 6). The icon 'stands in' by virtue of its
resemblance, as in a painting of a tree having an iconic relationship with an
actual tree in reality. A part of the tree with a concrete or direct relationship
with the real tree, a leaf for instance, is indexical. The symbol has an arbitrary
relationship, acquired conventionally, as in the word 'tree'. The sound of the
word 'tree', the letters of the word 'tree' standing for the sound, and the actual
perceived image of the tree, have no similarity to each other and are culturally
agreed upon (Polkinghome 1988 : 6).
In discussing symbolic mental representations (percepts, images and image
schemata) or the way the mind projects its perceptually gained knowledge, the
icon or image in perception merits most attention here. It is important to
distinguish vvhat is referred to as a particular mental 'picture' or an image of a
particular object, from a schematic mental image. The mental picture has a
particularly 'rich' visual relationship with a particular referent, vvhereas the
schema is a thought structure with no particular referent. In cognitive science
'schemata' are thought of as: 'general knowledge structures, ranging from
conceptual networks to scripted activities to narrative structures and even to
theoretical frameworks', the means by vvhich 'Ne organise knowledge (Johnson
1987 : 19). While schemata are not templates, they contain many features vvhich
are not only visual but include kinaesthetic characteristics, and involve continuous
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transformations, associations and generalisations and can be instantiated
indefinitely in a very wide range of contexts (Johnson 1987 : 19 - 21).
Johnson explains their specific nature as follows:
.. ,they (schemata) do not have the specificity of rich images or mental
pictures. They operate at one level of generality and abstraction
above concrete, rich images. A schema consists of a small number
of parts and relations, by virtue of which it can structure indefinitely
many perceptions, images, and events. In sum, image schemata
operate at a level of mental organisation that falls between abstract
propositional structures, ... and particular concrete images (Johnson
1987: 29).
The role of the imagination in this process of mental organisation and the
changing conceptions of this role are important to this discussion of metaphor.
Imagination is understood to be responsible for the actualisation of sense
perceptions in the form of images and, as the earlier discussion indicates, the
precise nature of image or mental rePresentation is debated.
As we have seen, the Western philosophical tradition has pitted the
imaginative capacity against rationality. Theories of Imagination are derived
mainly from two traditions (Johnson 1987 : 141). The first is the Platonic
tradition, derived from interpretations of Plato's writings, in which the
imagination is understood as a faculty that can only grasp images of the
illusory and changeable 'shadow' realm of the sensory and physical 'NOrld.
Knowledge of things gained from imagination was not associated with the so-
called essence of things, but was considered to. be associated with fantasy
and poetic imagery arising from irrational inspiration. Images resulting from
this aroused the same irrational emotion from the audience. The second
tradition is based on specific references Aristotle made to the imagination in
his writings. As a faculty of mind that mediates between sense perception and
reason, the imagination was understood to form images, either recalled (from
memory) or from sense perception of the Present, and even from dreams.
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There is a dired correlation between sense data from the physical world, and
the 'phantasmata', that is, images formed by the imagination, which become
the content upon which our conceptual understanding operates.
In the former Platonic tradition, the resulting images are sensuous, illusionary
and imitative of the decaying physical realm, unfiltered by the mind. In the
latter Aristotelian tradition, the images are the result of empirical experience
acted on by thought, and they become available to us as the content of
knowledge. The Aristotelian tradition was incorporated into early Empiricist
philosophical attempts to account for the nature of cognitive processes in
which imagination came to be regarded as a faculty mechanically giving rise to
images rather than as a creative and inventive process.
During the seventeenth century there was a serious attempt to include
imagination in a unified theory of cognition which took account of its
mechanical operations in conjundion with so-called artistic genius. It came to
be understood, broadly, as an image generating faculty, giving rise to novelty
in art, as psychological rather than logical in nature (Johnson 1987 : 144). The
Empiricist view of imagination thus gave an account of the link between
perception, association, memory and images, but as generating only
omamental ideas that had to be controlled by rational or logical thought
(Johnson 1987 : 146). There was no account of a cognitive structure of
imagination with semantic import. The 'images' derived were considered to be
nothing but the receding memory of sense impressions (Hobbes in Johnson :
146).
The philosopher Paul Ricoeur understands the innovative meaning produced
by metaphors in poetic discourse, as 'schematised' by the imagination. His
theory of metaphor unifies meaning with the generated images, and manifests
as a renewed vision of reality. A more detailed account of this theory follows
in Chapter Three.
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An important early theory of metaphoric struduring of reality involving the
imagination, is that of the eighteenth century rhetorician and philosopher,
Giambattista Vico (1668 - 1744). Vico, who was never influential in his own
lifetime, has attracted recent interest. He developed alternative ideas to the
mechanistic, empiricist mainstream of Newtonian and Cartesian thought.
These ideas can now be seen as unique and progressive theories about the
origin of language, the mind as an extension of the body, and the imagination
as the creative faculty of the mind that gave rise to conceptual, abstract
thought. He published his investigations in The New Science (1744) but was
not translated into English until 1948 and was therefore not widely known to
mainstream science and philosophy. Interestingly, this work was earlier read
by poets and literary thinkers like Coleridge (1772 - 1834) and later Joyce
(1882 - 1941), who were creatively inspired by his ideas (Danesi 1993 : 40;
Mali 1992 : 38-9).
Of interest to this study, are Vico's ideas on the nature of signs (images) and
how they are generated by the mind. Vico's focus is on the nature and role of
the imaginative faculty together with other structuring features of the mind,
mainly metaphor, in this process. For him, metaphor and imagination are the
transforming processes which 'invented' thought, language and culture, in
effect making the mind responsible for creating all social and cultural
structures. Vico's ideas are now increasingly being correlated with scientific
and anthropological findings (Danesi 1993 : 40 - 43). What follows is a brief
account of Danesi's interpreted scenario of Vico's hypothesis for the
development of symbolic representation expounded in The New Science.
According to Vico, the cognitive faculty of early humans was outwardly
expressed in the form of metaphors, symbols and myths, to symbolically
transform experience. The imagination, as the faculty for the invention of
symbolic images, is considered to be the primary tool for engaging with the
world of sense experience. Encoding and mental constructs of a .symbolic
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form \Yere thought to humanise the 'NOrld and make it comprehensible for its
early inhabitants, explaining natural phenomena like seasons, planets, fire and
so on. According to Vico, deposits of myth in our culture constituted the key
to understanding the history of the development of society and its culture. This
scenario corresponds surprisingly \Yell to contemporary models of mind and
systems theories (Danesi 1993: 57)8.
For the sake of conformity, and reflecting a general point of agreement in
these theories, the cognitive perceptual fundions refer to the struduring
capacity of the mind to pattern perceptions into semiotic and semantic
systems in cultureS. Our ability to make connections and build relationships in
various ways forms the basis of meaning, and metaphor is given increasing
importance in this process. The metaphorizing capacity appropriates
information from our perceptions and iconic strudures and forges concepts.
Later on in this study, I refer to aspeds of Vico's model of symbolic expression
as 'iconic signs', in a description of the development of iconic imagery in my
own drawings.
Vico's most interesting theory was how reflective consciousness and
primordial meaning came about in the primitive or preconceptual mind,
resulting in fictional patterning of perceptions into models of reality. Danesi
describes this process thus:
SEvolved symbolic systems involve participation and therefore the intention to communicate information
and meaning via manifest expressive means, such as verbal or visual symbols. Systems theories
account for the emergence of multiple levels et reality, the material, organic and mental. The mental
realm, or realm of meaning and reflective consciousness is the most evolved and is the point at which
language systems develop. According to PoIkinghorne, this mental realm has produced "a special
stratum of the environment - culture and meaning - in which we exist. This stratum holds traditions and
conventions to which individuals are connected in a dialectic manner; they provide individuals with 8
common symbolc environment that informs their categories of thought and social actions...•
(PoIkinghome 1988: 3). Thus, the realm of meaning is an activity that produces cultural products and
artefacts, as a result of acting on the elements of our sensory responses and perceptions from the
organic realm. The realm et meaning structures this perceptual experience, connecting things, and
forming the patterns et meaning on which systems et language are based (PoIkinghome 1988: 6).
PoIkinghome stresses the importance for members of a culture to have a good general knowledge of the
"full range of accumulated meanings" in order to properly participate. Furthermore, he says these
"Cultural stocks et meaning are not static but are added to by new contributions from members, and
deleted by lack of use" (PoIkinghorne 1988: 6).
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the ingegno [inventive faculty] emerged to organise the imagination's
iconic signs [mapped mental images] into structured pattems and
models [syntax, images, nat7Btive).. .iconic signs are stored in the
fomi of percepts (units derived from perceptjon) by the memoria
[deep level memory], the invented structures of the ingegno, are
stored as -categories·-i.e., as structures derived from combinations
of percepts that under1ie our models of space, time emotions, etc.
(Danesi 1993 : 51). Note: italics in square brackets are my own.
According to Vico's model, metaphoric thought is generated through this
process, in the interaction between the imagination and the structuring faculty
he called 'poetic logic'. Metaphor creates surface level cognition (i.e. a level
of mind YA'lich can express these concepts in some discernible form) by
connecting, categorising, and generating concepts and models, transforming
iconic units into concepts and later, semantic systems, Vico termed 'fables'
(Danesi 1993 : 53 - 54). These symbolic systems were characterised by
metaphor in the form of tropes and myth. The nature of this early
metaphorical expression was concrete, analogical and iconic YA'lich he
compared to a child's first attempts to express things (Danesi 1993: 65).
Vico based his investigations into the symbols generated by the mind on the
interpretation of myths as the first narrative explanations of environmental
phenomena, and on the early emergence of signs, as expressions of thought
YA'lich eventually became language. He constructs a model of the 'primitive
mind', YA'lich he saw as reflected in the structures of its myths. He says:
'(their) minds 'Nere not ... abstract, refined... because they 'Nere entirely
immersed in the senses, buffeted by the passions, buried in the body' (Vico in
Danesi 1993: 69).
The images in the primitive mind thus originated from bodily experience.
Emerging from this precognitive and prelinguistic level of sense impressions
and the body's experience, these· first 'images', were transformed by the
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imagination into iconic signs (Danesi 1993 : 68). The first external
expressions of this deep level of reflective consciousness, 'Nere thus visual,
they 'Nere 'signs, whether gestural or physical objects', and 'writing', a term
Vico used to mean pictorial iconic signs or 'poetic characters' rather than
alphabetic characters (Vico in Danesi 1993 : 69). In this internal form, the
iconic signs are models of perceived referents in the '.NOrld. They only later
take the form of externally represented referents, in visual form.
In the initial stage of outward representation, according to Danesi, the body
becomes a 'signifying system' as a gesturing, posturing, kinetic instrument,
eventually, using 'hand signs' to make drawing movements and marks on
rocks, walls and clay, later incorporating tools. This '.NOuld eventually become
symbolic writing, like cuneiform, and culminate as alphabetic writing and more
elaborate pictorial images (drawings) (Danesi1993 : 70).
A perceptually and physically based iconic mode of thinking and being, was
later transformed into a conceptual one, based on abstract models of the
'.NOrld. This transformation was made possible by metaphor, a term Vico used
to refer to both the mental process and the products it generated in the form of
figurative tropes. In character, Vico's metaphor was a kind of catalyst of the
mind, which first encoded perceptions into concepts, and as it continued to do
this, created a platform from which to produce increasingly complex models
out of the initial simpler concepts. These models 'Nere genuine products of
mind, independent of the context of the immediate sensory experience, no
longer as close to their source (referents) as the original concrete iconic signs,
but an entirely new fictive '.NOrld with its own rational syntactic and semantic
system. This system of meaning concretely represented in an increasingly
complex way, and in time included the presence of independent symbols like
hieroglyphs, pictograms and alphabets, grammar systems and all the verbal
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tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony and so on)9. The latter are
the many conventional ways in which metaphor figuratively connects initial
perceptual domains and secondary conceptual domains. Metaphor can be
said to have created a space in the mind that could generate a virtual world, or
'fables' as Vico referred to them. These are equivalent to Ricoeur's fictive
images resulting from metaphoric schematisation, or the fusion of meaning
and image.
Surface level cognition generates externalised symbolic expression as
language and culture, displayed as visual images, narratives, rituals, play and
other patterned forms of expression. According to Danesi, from current
theories of iconic thinking, it appears that pictorial representation developed
out of gesture and preceded vocal language. Archaeological records show
the first expressions of thought are visual and kinetic, not vocal (Danesi 1993 :
68).
Vico distinguishes three forms of language media or symbolic expression,
each developing in three separate corresponding 'ages' of humans. The so-
called age of gods used concrete metaphorical language based on gesture
and expressed orally as myth and as pictographic writing; the age of heroes
invented a more conventional, symbolic language less dependent on direct
correlation; the age of humans produced a highly conventional language of
signs (the alphabet).
What is significant about Vico's notion of culture is that these cultural
manifestations become the source of stimulus upon which we later act and
continually form new representations, a form of intertextuality. In this sense,
early humans were makers of their 0\\'11 worlds, their 0\\'11 system of truths, and
of their society, visible in social customs and institutions, which in turn
9 These tropes are classified according to traditional rhetoric and can now be defined
according to more contemporary practice.
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reflected the structure of their language. Metaphor, as described by Vico, is a
way of thinking about events and of being in the world, a primitive 'poetic
imagination' that was the foundation of culture and a creator of worlds.
Metaphor can be thought of as generating the materials to construct worlds.
Culture is defined by Danesi as 'an agreement to live together on the basis of
communal "sense-making'" (Danesi 1993 : 80). Metaphor uses this system of
agreement in order to generate new meanings, but by continually providing the
conditions for undermining the conventions sustained by the system. Vico
acknowledges this subversive and transcendent nature of metaphor, in that
metaphor invents alternative identities, institutions and cultural artefacts in
opposition to those entrenched in society by authority. His ideas challenge the
view of progress as a linear movement and formulate instead a cyclical spiral
movement of progress, assimilation and decline in which metaphor is a
catalyst.
The thread of Empiricist accounts of the imagination emerges as a more
unified theory in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in which he provides a
solution to the problem of unifying images and abstract concepts. The theory
initially follows the standard Empiricist view, claiming that uncategorised and
singular perceptions must be unified by some factor in the mind that can
bridge the gap betvleen percepts and the formation of concepts. The role of
forming images, recalling past images and recognising and associating
images or mental representations (sense percepts, images) into categories, is
given to the imaginative faculty.
In addition to this reproductive form of mental representation, Kant cites the
imagination as a factor that makes it possible to go beyond privately structured
realities, in order for experience to be shared in a public domain of knowledge.
The imagination as 'productive', unifies conscious states into a kind of
objective ground to which our experience is always subject. This 'general
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structure' transcends empirical experience and generates schema, categorical
patterns that are imposed on the content of experience. Productive
imagination, as a unified structure of consciousness, schematises experience.
A schema is neither an image, nor a concept, but a mediating activity that can
generate content figuratively, and link images and concepts (Johnson 1987 :
149). This schematising nature of the productive imagination has been
influential in Ricoeur's theory of metaphor, particularly regarding his notion of
the image as a fiction and not as a replication of perception.
Ricoeur has described 'image' in terms of a theory of metaphor, which opens
h_. _ _ __ __ _ _~ .__
up new ways for the image to refer to reality. The image in traditional
- ..- -- - ------
philosophy has been associated with perception, a mental representation
(percepts, images or concepts) derived from sense impressions and excluded
------_. - ---- - - - -------
from meaning or sense. The image is thus understood to 're-present' an
- - - -_. - - - - -
empirical presence, to appear as a replica of what has been perceived.
Imagination is seen as an associative function that merely establishes
similarities to enable this representation. Ricoeur E?stablishes a more pivotal
role for imagination and image in the metaphorical process. He draws on
-. -- -_. .~
Kant's account of schematism and productive imagination as contributing to
creative, cognitive organisation, by synthesising image and concept in the
notion of a schema. Ricoeur, quoting Kant, remarks that the schema provides
images for concepts. Ricoeur explains: 'in the schema, the liaison bel'Neen
logical component and sensible component, or if one prefers, between the
verbal and the non-verbal movement of the image, is effectuated' (Ricoeur
1979: 126). Ricoeur proposes that images are derived from language and not
from perception and he uses poetry as an example of language that displays
images, in order to construct his theory.
In metaphor the image is understood as 'discourse assuming the nature of a
body', or discourse as 'a quasi-bodily externalisation' (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 :
142), not as a perception attached to language but as meaning embodied in
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language. The semantic innovation characteristic of metaphor generates
images in language, that is, it gives a figurative form to meaning. The
imagination is intrinsic to the new meaning or semantic innovation invested as
image. In order to establish the semantic role of the image Ricoeur attempts
to fuse meaning in expression (sense as objective content) and its
representation as 'mental actualisation' or image, within a theory of
imagination as the 'schematisation of metaphoric attribution' (Ricoeur in Sacks
1979 : 147). Imagination is the 'apperception' or conscious insight into the
new predication of the metaphor. The resolution is the new meaning that
comes out of the new metaphorical 'congruence', made possible by
imaginative insight. The imagination, as productive, assimilates the differences
in the terms, ideas or domains that the metaphorical statement draws
together.
The 'pictorial' dimension of imagination, is well explained in I. A. Richards' well
known description of the union of sense and figure, as tenor and vehicle, or
semantic innovation visualised. Ricoeur's words for this relationship are 'the
conceptual import and its pictorial envelope' (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 : 147).
The difficulty here is to explain how schematisation of the predicative
assimilation is displayed as iconic. In order to explain this Ricoeur must re-
define the nature of the image:
By displaying a flow of images, discourse initiates changes of logical
distance, generates rapprochement. Imaging or imagining, thus, is
the concrete milieu in which and through which we see similarities.
To imagine then is not to have a mental picture of something but to
display relations in a depicting mode (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 : 148).
The icon is the fusion between image and language, the matrix from which
new meaning emerges. Image is not associated with or attached to meaning,
it is a 'reading' of the relation (attribution) through the iconic matrix. The
'concrete milieu' is the matrix from which meaning (icon) emerges.
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The images are elicited, produced and 'read' in the context or structure of
poetic language, the fictive work. Image becomes an iconic presentation of
new meaning in figurative discourse, in the framework of language. New
meaning in language generates new images. Fiction is the context in which
imagination can be productive. 'Imagination at work - in a work - produces
itself as a YJOrld' (Ricoeur 1979 :123). Thus images are discussed in the
sphere of language as fictions and not in the context of perception as mental
pictures of absent referents. For Ricoeur fiction as a 'work' is something
'wrought', writing a poem, telling a story, making worlds.
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CHAPTER 2
Metaphor: Theories and Attitudes
To acquire a feeling for the imaginative role of language, we must
patiently seek, in every wortl, the desires for othemess, for double
meaning, for metaphor. Bachelard (Cited in Gaudin 1971 : 21)
Metaphor, has been described as 'a "tool" that the mind uses to explore reality_._._- -" "- - -_.. -- ---~ - -- -- - - -
and to give order_~nd._~h~en~_ to .our_~th.e~se chaotic experiences'
(Danesi 1993 : 124). It can also be said that this ordering capacity gives rise
to metaphors 'internally' as conceptualised models, as well as 'externally',
most commonly, but not exclusively, in the form of verbal or linguistic tropes.
At its simplest, as a fundamental feature of thought and expression, metaphor
is essentially a comparative and connecting mode to establish similarities
between dissimilar things in our thought and experience.
Metaphor first appears as a specific term (from the Greek 'NOrds meta 'beyond'
and pherein 'to carry') in Aristotle's studies of language in his Rhetoric and
Poetics to refer to a '!'By of exp-ressi!!~L~mp~risons. As a component of
language in traditional rhetoric, metaphor was classified as a trope or figure,
among others such as synecdoche, metonymy, simile and so on, a stylistic
elaboration on the basic or literal use of language. The 'NOrd trope means a
turn or twist, and indicates a disruption of the system of what is considered
normal or common meaning assigned to 'NOrds, what Hawkes refers to as 'the
common practice of ordinary speakers' (Hawkes 1972 : 2). In a context of a
given ~!".~~!,ity_of language. us.~s,_~etap~~~s_ and other tropes. r~!y_ on thE!
receptive experience of a read~r or_audi~Qce, who participates in the
e~change .of _m~ani~.9~_wi~hin th_~ ~mmon_ .symbolic structure.s _of_that
community.
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If language is the primary symbolic system for organising and constructing our
experience of reality, it at the same time establishes a consensus, a system of
values in our culture, through which it proceeds to shape our world. Figurative
meanings eventually become part of the usual meanings, as 'dead'
metaphors, cease to challenge, and then reinforce value systems. However,
novel and challenging figures can force categories of thought open into new
configurations. The power of me!ap'~'?! is thi~ tra!!sfo~ational ability, its
possibili~es for1h~ ~I!~~pecteC! ~I'! ~t'!e_~~bi~~~C?~s a_n_d categ~~es~_i~_ able to
prod~ce, thereby _al.s~_~,!s~~ng that meaning does not remain fixed in certain
value ~y.!te!!1s. This characteristic is itself metaphorically expressed by the
original Greek meaning of the word metaphor - 'to carry beyond' - in the
image of a transporting vessel in which meaning is carried into another
territory.
Aristotle's views on language essentially rested on distinctions between literal
and non-literal ways of thinking and speaking. He classified language, in order
to distinguish its different intentions or strategies, as logical, rhetorical or
poetic. Figurative language, as a departure from the literal, introducing a
substitution based on similarity, was in his view dispensable to the essential
meaning of a statement but was suitable in poetic discourse. The faith in
clarity of expression and reference is a result of Aristotle's adherence to the
idea that language has a stable relationship with the objective world to which it
refers, it does not alter reality. If the ambigUity in language, resulting from the
use of tropes, was acceptable only in poetry, and not in statements dealing
with truth, logic and cognitive meaning, then, according to Aristotle, it could not
result in knowledge of the world or self-knowledge. There is an implication
here that creative language is not necessarily involved with an intention to
communicate knowledge and that it can be regarded as subversive to a
coherent worldview.
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Attitudes towards metaphor, in later Western thought, can be said to have
been defined by Aristotle's ideas, which form the basis of some of the debates
surrounding its usage and purpose in language and thought (Danesi 1993
:123). .In fact, Aristotle's understanding of metaphor - an analogous
comparison between two concepts, words or entities, introducing a similarity
between previously dissimilar things - has not undergone any fundamental
alteration, at least within the 'objectivist' view of meaning. This is called the
comparative or similarity theory of metaphor, in which the properties of one
domain are compared to another domain and found to be 'like' or similar to
each other and are able to mutually enhance each other, for example, old age
is like winter. For an appreciation of later theories of metaphor, it is important
to note that in comparative or substitution theories, the metaphoric transfer
reveals similarities that are perceived to already exist in an objective world.
Furthermore, according to the comparative theory, as deviations from reality
usually described and understood in literal, objective terms, metaphors are
understood in terms of the restituted original/literal meaning. Thus the
semantic novelty of the metaphor is interchangeable with and can be
paraphrased in 'literal' terms and cannot be regarded as creative or innovative.
Although Aristotle acknowledged that metaphor was important psychologically,
even that it had some cognitive force, he still regarded it as an essentially
decorative enhancement of expression by means of comparison and
substitution, most suitable for poetic expression and rhetorical persuasion. To
truly describe reality one must, in his view, use literal propositions.
The long rhetorical tradition after Aristotle, upheld this restricted view of
metaphor in the increasingly rigorous rules and taxonomies it devised for
language use. Within the philosophical traditions of logical positivism,
language was vie'Ned as indispensable, but unreliable unless it developed
procedures for determining the verification of scientific statements, and
figurative language was regarded as highly unstable. This was the dominant
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stance held until the Romantic movement began to challenge and erode the
restraints imposed on language, in particular its creative capacity and
enhancement of language (Hawkes 1972).
An entirely new understanding of mind emerges with Romanticism, in which
the imagination plays a unifying role. A conception of metaphor was
introduced, characterised as the linguistic expression of the operation of the
imagination. In this description by Coleridge (1772 -1834), he speaks of the
power of imagination to 'reveal(s) itself in the balance or reconcilement of
opposite or discordant qualities: of sameness, with difference; general with the
concrete; the idea with the image; the individual with the representative; the
sense of novelty and freshness with old and familiar objects' (Coleridge in
Hawkes 1972 : 43,44). Significantly, Coleridge's understanding of
imagination, which he terms 'synthetic and magical', meant that far from it
presenting pre-existing qualities about things, it acts on, and gives shape to
the 'WOrld. Implicit in this metaphorical fusion is the creative participation of the
reader in the process of reconciling conflict and diversity, out of which brand
new perceptions come, a foreshadowing of contemporary ideas concerning
the reader as a contributor to meaning rather than as a passive receiver of
ideas. Also important to this discussion is the imagination as the faculty that
combines the 'idea with the image', implying a semantic role for figurative
language. The fusion of the imagination and metaphor has affinities to Vico's
ideas in the New Science, of which Coleridge had made a study in the early
1820's (Mali 1992 : 1).
The continuity of these notions of creativity in metaphor was provided much
later in the twentieth century by the writings of I.A. Richards. Richards is one
of the few theorists who regarded metaphor as underlying all thought
processes, which give rise to explicit linguistic metaphors. Perceived reality is
'a product of earlier and unwitting metaphor' (Richards in Johnson 1987 : 69).
Richards concentrated more on metaphor's specific operation in language
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than on its ontological role. His use of the terms tenor and vehicle to refer to
the dual components of a metaphor also reinforces the semantic component of
poetic language as the union of the image with concept.
The philosopher Max Black can be credited with the first serious philosophical
analysis of metaphor after Richards. The significance of his theory to this
discussion, lies in his assertion that meaning is generated by metaphors, in an
'interactive' process, whereby the domains of meaning implicated in the
metaphor are not interchangeable existing similarities, but whole systems of
meaning, which together create additional, new meaning and extend
conceptual boundaries. Metaphors create similarities rather than exposing
those already there and therefore constitute the structure of experience. Black
describes it in this way: 'some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality
that the metaphor's production helps to constitute. But that is no longer
---------------
surprising if one believes that the "world" is necessarily a world under a certain
description - or a world seen from a certain perspective. Some metaphors
can create such a perspective' (Black in Johnson 1987 : 70).
In his study, The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur refers to and attempts to integrate
a number of the more recent theories of metaphor such as those of Richards,
Black and others (Ricoeur 1978 : 4). As we have seen, some arguments
present the traditional view of rhetoric, that metaphor is merely embellishment
with no inherent semantic or referential value in discourse. Other arguments
present metaphor, in contradiction to these traditions of classical rhetoric, as
an intrinsic creative strategy in language that interferes with conventional or
agreed upon meaning, with profound implications for language as a
commodity. The ambiguity of meaning and reference, the difficulty of the
exchange of meaning, as well as the innovative productiVity of metaphor is
revealed by these arguments. Ricoeur has stated his aim as showing how
metaphor, because of ambiguity and imagination as intrinsic factors, is able to
effect a redescription of reality, not just a re-presentation.
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Ricoeur cites metaphor as 'the rhetorical process by which discourse
unleashes the po\Yer that certain fictions have to redescribe reality' (Ricoeur
1978 : 7). In this process, what is the nature of reference? How do metaphors
refer to objects and reality outside language? What is the nature of
representation and role of the image? What is the place of the author and
reader in this process?
In the next chapter I give a selective presentation of Ricoeur's understanding
of metaphorical reference which functions as a framework for my




The Virtual World of Meaning: Distance and Proximity
The Theory of Paul Ricoeur
The ideal source is not some mythical event that took place before
the verbal expression, but a text which is a tissue of words and
images and meanings... a musical space in which a theme develops
its own variations. Italo Calvino (1999: 240)
Although language is generally regarded as unstable in its reference, the
philosopher, Ricoeur pursues a theme, in his examination of the metaphorical
process and the meaning it produces, which aims to present metaphor as the
exemplar of creativity through language. While Ricoeur is concemed with the
problem of reference in discourse generally, he is primarily interested in poetic
discourse as a particular means of relating to the 'M>rld. His theory of
metaphor, and the nature of its reference, is seen to 'M>rk at the core of
language, in particular poetic expression and its figurative nature, in which our
sense of reality is continuously re-invented.
Ricoeur's interpretation of metaphoric signification as 'iconic', provides an
explanation for the semantic role of the image and the paradox of the
suspension of literal reference in the creation of new meaning, and is thus
presented as the source of invention in poetic discourse. Ricoeur does not
contradict the dichotomy between the poetic function and the referential
function proposed in literary criticism10. Rather, he proposes a paradoxical
strategy in poetic discourse as ambiguous reference, or to use Jacobson's
term, split reference. He thus proposes the capacity of metaphoric language,
to not only reach reality, but to change it as \Y811 and in so doing, our
experience of being in the 'M>rld. Simply put, his theory of metaphor-pres_ents
10 Critics such as Roman Jacobson and others, emphasise the self-referential nature of poetic
discourse {Ricoeur 1979: 142}.
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a kind of reference, inherent in poetic texts, that generates new realities for
----- --_._-- ----- - - --- - --- -
makers and readers/audience alike.
Ricoeur regards metaphor as the exemplar of creativity and its. process as a
pattern !or !~ading and interpretifl9 poetic text~. Reference in discourse
enables a reconnection with the world, and 'it is because there is first
something to say, because we have an experience to bring to language, that
conversely language is not only directed towards ideal meanings but also
refers to what is' (Ricoeur in Valdes 1991 : 6). However, in saying something
about the world, metaphors and poetic texts are not descriptive or literal,
instead they suspend literal signification and reference to reality that is
assumed in normal language use. Metaphorical reference becomes indirect
and ambiguous. A tension is set up between a literal sense and a
metaphorical sense, creating a split reference in the statement between the
ordinary and the fictive.
Ricoeur extends the notion of expression as poetic discourse, to the term
'works', to encompass other representational or symbolic systems of meaning,
and the term 'fiction' to indicate a category of invented reality (Ricoeur 1979 :
116).
I organise the following discussion of Ricoeur's ideas around the following key
topics pertaining to this study: ambiguity in language as a creative strategy;
sense and reference, specifically in metaphoric language; meaning and
interpretation as appropriation of the world of the work by the reader or viewer;
the image as fiction in metaphoric reference.
As stated earlier Ricoeur's main theme is to present metaphor as an intrinsic
strategy within discourse that brings about new meaning. Ricoeur compares
the creativity in poetic discourse, to other strategies in language with different
aims, namely ordinary language and scientific language.
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The constant test to ordinary users of language is finding solutions to the
problems of successfully communicating information to others, and of avoiding
misunderstanding and ambiguity. In other uses, say in scientific applications,
the need is to introduce measures that do away with ambiguity altogether so
that the 'identity of a meaning' can be preserved (Ricoeur 1973 (b): 75). In
scientific language, there is only one context. In ordinary language context is
the guide to the selection of sense in which words are used in a given context,
sentence or discourse, in order to establish meaning.
First consider Ricoeur's ideas on the polysemic nature of language and
strategies for coping with this in order to achieve certain aims, namely
creativity. Polysemy is the ability of words to have more than one meaning.
This characteristic of words gives economy to language and therefore the
necessity for the selective contextual use of words in which sense changes.
Context includes, how the word is used in a sentence, as vvell as how the
speech situation influences understanding, by its participants, speakers and
hearers. The decoding of a message is interpretation, 'in this broad sense... a
process by which vve use all the available contextual determinants to grasp the
actual meaning of a given message in a given situation' (Ricouer 1973 (b) :
71). Interpretation always implies ambiguity and the possibility of
misunderstanding. Hence, the development of strategies each with different
levels of tolerance for ambiguity.
Whereas the strategy of ordinary language is to reduce polysemy for purposes
of communicating information successfully, scientific language aims to do
away with it entirely in order to 'e~s_u~e t~e i~entity of meanin-9' (Ricoeur 1973
(b) :75). Poetic language, hovvever, contains a 'functional ambiguity' (Ricoeur
1973 (b) :72). If vve understand poetic language to be the creative use of
language for purposes other than communication, then its strategy is
polysemy itself, or metaphor making use of polysemy. 'Poetic language is no
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less about reality than any other use of language but refers to it by means of a
complex strategy... an abolition of the ordinary reference attached to
descriptive language '(Ricoeur 1979 : 151).
Following on from Richards' idea, that V«lrds can only be metaphoric in the
context of a statement, Ricoeur bases his understanding of the operation of
metaphor on the sentence as a basic unit of meaning, the semantic content in
sentences and their reference to a V«lrld outside of language. He thus shifts
the discussion of metaphor away from a consideration of signs towards a
consideration of sense and the communication of meaning through the
reference in discourse. As signifiers, V«lrds 'have meaning only inasmuch as
sentences have meaning' (Ricoeur 1973 (b) : 69). Sentences do not signify,
they intend, they designate something about something (predication) and the
meaning in discourse is this intention that is directed towards reality outside of
language. It is the extralinguistic aspect of discourse that gives it creative
potential. 'The referential function of discourse is that it is about things, it
points to things, it represents things' (Ricoeur 1973 (b) : 70). Each sentence
or discourse is invested with the intent towards knowledge of or about
something. Metaphor, however, is a constant reminder of ambiguity, of the
fabrication that is a V«lrld built out of signs.
Ricoeur is concerned with the presence of the speaker within the intentional
aspects of language to say something about the world in a public context of
potential receivers of the discourse. Sentences or statements refer and so
does the speaker have 'referring intentions' 'Nhen words are directed at reality
(Ricoeur in Valdes 1991 : 5). He explains the reference of a statement as an
'event' of meaning 'because we are in the world, because we are affected by
. situations, and because we have something to say, we have experience to
bring to language'. We therefore express its 'sense' and not just its signs
(Ricoeur in Valdes 1991 : 4 - 5).
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Meaning only comes about in the process of a refiguration of the intention in
the author's statement by a reader. Meaning and intention, for Ricoeur, are
never fixed, and are formed in the dialectic between the presence of the work
to a reader or audience. Although he perceives the possibility of shared
meaning in language and of shared commentary, there is no search for
absolutes: 'The dialectic of distanciation and appropriation is the last word in
the absence of absolute knovvIedge' (Ricoeur in Valdes 1991 : 8). 'Distanciation'
means the text or work as alienated from a current reader's historicity.
'Appropriation' of meaning is the apprehension of a text or work, as a
projected world, by a reader. When Ricoeur refers to the work, as a text11 he
also means 'the kind of world' presented by the text to a reader. It is in the
precise nature of this world that metaphor plays a defining role.
Ricoeur's understanding of interpretation and his concern with how sense is
made and meaning communicated in expression, is thus explained by the
dialectic of sense and reference brought to discourse by those who engage in
it: 'only this dialectic [sense and reference] says something about the relation
between language and the ontological condition of being in the world' (Ricoeur
in Valdes 1991 : 5).
In metaphoric statements the mediation of the readers' imaginative 'insight' is
what makes new meaning possible. In order to understand and give meaning
to what is alien in a statement, the reader appropriates the alien content.
Metaphors are responsible for 'alien' or discordant content in statements and it
is how this content is assimilated that is important to Ricoeur's explanation of
the role of imagination, as productive, in the metaphoric process.
If the action of metaphor is examined closely it is evident how imagination
11 In cuttural studies, texts refer to non-linguistic cuttural forms as texts. Ricouer here talks
initially about literary texts but extends the reference to works, meaning literature and other
artworKs.
is involved in this assimilation of discordance and with the production of
reil rTlEB'lng. In a rnetapla',~ present in the literal interpretation of
sense in a statement, forces us to look for a new signification in the
predicative structure. Since the predicate is responsible for producing
sense in an enunciation, this is identified as the pivotal point of the
metaphorical turn towards new meaning. The resolution to the semantic
mystery is the metaphor. The innovative sense and the new reference in
metaphorical statements comes out of this resolution produced by the
reader. The metaphor lies between the literal semantic content we 'NOuld
normally derive from a statement and the new or alien predicative
attribution assigned to the statement. This transfer of sense by the
reader disrupts the normative code of predicative attribution pertaining to
the customary use of language. The metaphor is the 'solution of the
enigma' not the enigma itself (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 :144).
Ricoeur situates the effect of metaphor on sense or meaning, within the
paradox of 'sameness and difference' or 'distance and proximity' in the
metaphoric system of reference (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 :146). He also
gives imagination a pivotal role in this paradox or tension set up in the
conflicting relations within the fields the metaphor brings together. This is
termed the negative side of the metaphor. 'The function of metaphor is to
make sense with nonsense, to transform a self-contradictory statement
into a significant self-contradiction' (Ricoeur 1973 (b) : 78).
The metaphor has to assimilate the antecedent order and the new order,
the previous incompatibility and the new compatibility, retaining the tensia1
between the two opposing references and meanings. This disorder,
in the metaphor, is the source of creativity. It is the reader who refigures
the collapse of the literal meaning into new meaning and imagination as
'productive' makes this occur. Th~ production of new meaning by the
imagination is the 'positive' side of the metaphor. The imagination,
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providing the insight, mediates between opposing remote domains the
metaphor connects and in 'seeing' the likeness within the difference,
produces the metaphorical meaning.
The intuitive act of imagination assimilates rather than mechanically
associates incompatibilities. The imagination produces categories and
compatabilities at the level of thought before the formation of concepts, as
schema, and as such it is understood in terms of Kant's schematism and
theory of productive imagination. Imagination is able to schematise the
metaphorical attribution described above:
... imagination, accordingly, is this ability to produce new kinds by
assimilation and to produce them not above the differences.
Imagination is this stage in the production of genres where the
generic kinship has not reached the level of conceptual peace and
rest but remains caught in the war between distance and proximity,
between remoteness and nearness (Ricoeur in sacks 1979 : 146 -
147).
If we reconsider the nature of schema, that it is neither an image or a concept,
that it falls between abstract structures and particular images and according to
Kant, supplies images for concepts, then the fusion of verbal meaning and
image can be explained as the 'schematisation' of metaphorical attribution. It
is on the nature of these images, displayed by discourse that Ricoeur's entire
theory depends.
The 'pictorial' aspect of imagination must be understood in terms of the
figurative nature of metaphors and not in terms of the image as a perceptual
residue attached to language. This 'depicting mode' of metaphoric discourse
Ricoeur desaibes as a blurring of the distinction between sense or meaning
and its representation or concrete display. This explains the necessary fusion
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between verbal and image function in order that the 'iconic' nature of metaphor
can be understood:
Imaging or imagining, thus, is the concrete milieu in which and
through which we see similarities. To imagine, then, is not to have a
mental picture of something but to display relations in a depicting
mode. Whether this depiction concems unsaid or unheard similarities
or refers to qualities, structures, localisation's, situations, attitudes, or
feelings, each time the new intended connection is grasped as what
the icon describes or depicts' (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 : 148).
The debate about the nature of the image concerns the inducement of poetic
images and their exact role in predicative assimilation. Poetic images can be
induced by any number of procedures and experiences, such as reading,
dreaming, delusional states, reverie and so forth. How can they be linked to
and made to be intrinsic to the production of sense in language? Ricoeur
argues that the most significant images are those 'generated in the thickness
of the imagining scene displayed by the verbal structure of the poem' (Ricoeur
in Sacks 1979 : 149). He refers specifically to Marcus B. Hesters' 'bound'
images aroused by the experience of reading, displayed and controlled by the
verbal structure. Similarly Ricoeur cites Gaston Bachelard's notion of
reverberation whereby the verbal meaning obtained from reading produces
images which 'rejuvenate and re-enact the traces of sensorial experience'
(Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 :149).
The image, as schema, is generated by language and acts as the lens,
screen, filter, grid, to use other metaphors, through which \Ne can read' the
metaphoric relations (Ricoeur 1979 :127). These relations are expressed as
the icon, 'the matrix' of new meaning or predicative attribution. Thus meaning
invests itself in an image.
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Ricoeur discusses the negative role of the image in reference as 'suspension'
of ordinary desaiptive reference to create the conditions for the new meaning
to emerge. He refers to this as 'primordial reference' that 'suggests, reveals,
unconceals the deep structures of reality', what phenomenology refers to as
'preobjective' (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 : 151-2). Imagination gives this
'suspension' a concrete or visible form and projects a new model to alter our
way of viewing reality:
The ultimate role of the image is not only to diffuse meaning across
diverse sensorial fields, to hallucinate thought in some way, but, on
the contrary, to effect a sort of epocll8 of the real, to suspend our
attention to the real, to place us in a state of non-engagement with
regard to perception or action, in short to suspend meaning... In this
state of non-engagement we try new ideas, new values, new ways of
being-in·the-wol1d (Ricoeur 1979 : 128)
This state of non-engagement is the dimension of fiction, the context of a VJOrk
in which imagination can 'play' , the condition for new VJOrlds to form.
Imagination is this state of absence, epache, where new visions are projected.
Fiction is a mode of reference that gives a new shape to reality. In fiction, the
image does not re-present things we have already perceived, 'fiction
addresses itself to the deeply rooted potentialities of reality to the extent that
they are absent from the actualities with which we deal in everyday life under
the mode of empirical control and manipulation' (Ricoeur in Sacks 1979 : 153).
In the following tVJO chapters I discuss this state of suspension and the
primordial reference resulting from it as the source of invention in examples of
visual art. The VJOrks are interpreted as iconic statements. These statements,
or images of fiction, make no claim to definitive meaning and are understood
in the context of the viewer's appropriation of discordance in terms that are
meaningful. I discuss the means by which suspension of ordinary reference
can be achieved; In the case of Cragg's VJOrk this is explained in terms of
38
metaphoric discordance and new attributions; In my own work the explanation
is more speculative and related to preconceptual conditions in which the




The Virtual World of Representation: Visible Absence
The Work of Tony Cragg
To perceive and to imagine are as antithetic as presence and
absence. To imagine is to absent oneself; it is to leap toward new
life. Bachelard (Cited in Gaudin 1971 : 21)
In the title of this chapter I use the term 'visible absence' in reference to the
work of the British sculptor Tony Cragg. The term refers to two aspects of his
work. The first is a reference to an impulse, evident in his pradice, to
imaginatively suspend conventional, utilitarian engagement with the world of
accustomed reality. The second is a reference to the work as an invented
category of physical and metaphorical objeds, a new form of life. This is not
the category of the aesthetic objed of cultural life, of objeds called 'sculpture',
in opposition to the category of objeds from the natural world, or the
commercial and industrial world for that matter. Nor is it a category of
dogmatic statements about the nature of the physical world and our place in it.
This new or other category is a result of a reassignment of consciousness and
value towards objeds, natural and cultural, and our physical and intelledual
interadion with them. A consideration of the nature of this category and the
aesthetic strategies Cragg employs to achieve his aims, is the subjed of this
chapter.
Tony Cragg is generally considered to be part of the late seventies generation
of so-called post-formalist sculptors (Celant 1996). In his redeployment of
found and readymade objeds he works within the tenets of Dada that
continued into late modernism in the neo-dada assemblages of the American
artist Robert Rauschenberg (b.1925) and others. His background in the field
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of science before choosing a career in art focuses attention on his intellectual
methods and motivations rather than his stylistic ones.
In his working practice Cragg uses analogical models to give new form to first
order kinetic experience, thoughts, and linguistic categories. In this sense his
sculptures are poetic fictions, imaginative and metaphorical projections,
symbolic of his bodily experience and affective states in the world. They re-
phrase linguistic references to the world and the conceptual categories used in
the course of our everyday lives. This is evident in the way Cragg uses
materials, in his approach to technology and in his titles for the works.
His images, because they instigate the collapse of established categories, are
iconic transformations, redescriptions of reality in the sense that Ricoeur
defines this process in his theory of metaphoric reference.
In his role as an artist, Cragg can be said to be engaged in generating myths
out of his poetic responses to banal and unappreciated objects and materials.
Cragg uses re-contextualising and re-identification as determinants in his
work, requiring his audience to participate in the process he sets in motion.
We are asked to make new sense of the ambiguity he creates, and our
vocabulary of responses is challenged, compelling us to build new syntactic
patterns. The use of unexpected materials in unpredictable combinations,
presented as sculpture, makes the works enigmatic, even problematic, and is
an invitation for a new attribution to be assigned to them. What could be more
unpoetic than a plastic detergent bottle (figs. 11 and 12), stained plastic
flotsam or a Formica veneer? The conditions the work creates for our
response are almost primordial, where logic is suspended, and, in a state of
'non-engagement' (to use Ricoeur's term for the context of fiction) we can
meditate in a playful realm, and re-assign value. Cragg's term for this kind of
poetic appreciation towards sculptural form and the world at large is 'erotic
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response', which describes a subtle respect towards all manner of things VtJe
might encounter in our daily lives (Cragg in Celant 316).
Cragg's images are new imaginative models for perceiving the world,
reductive instruments for condensing and augmenting reality. Ricoeur
explains this augmentation as the result of a deviation from what is thought of
as 'ordinary vision', a reality which is prejudicial, concerned with everyday
interests and reinforced by our acceptance of dominant descriptions of reality
in popular scientific discourse (Ricoeur, 1979 :133). To get closer to a
primordial reality , he says , 'VtJe have to amend not only our ideas as to what
an image is, but also our prejudices as to what reality is' (Ricoeur, 1979 :133).
Poetic fictions put ordinary reality in a state of crisis and break down these
prejudices. Cragg's work instigates this crisis of identity.
I have stated Cragg's aims and interests as an artist in the introduction to this
study. As an artist Cragg sees himself as part of the process of production in
cultural life in general, rather than being engaged in an exclusively aesthetic
pursuit. Many of his statements about his work reiterate the need for a
profound change in our attitudes and sense of responsibility towards objects
and materials from the physical world VtJe are part of, for a variety of reasons.
This change is necessary simply for our survival, for processes of self-
definition and for the exercise of our intellectual and poetic freedom (Cragg in
Celant 1996). He interprets our present approach to production and
consumption as irresponsible and poVtJer-based, an attitude built into our
essentially materialistic, utilitarian relationship with objects and materials
(Cragg in Celant 98). These attitudes are embedded in and further generated
by our thought and language, and it is at the semantic level that change must
be forthcoming, not at the physical, material level. Cragg, hoVtJever, considers
the material level to be the most constant factor in our lives and in the history
of our productive and technological relationship with the environment.
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The material level is therefore like a primordial touchstone, reconfiguring itself
constantly but consisting of the same elemental matter. Our intellectual and
ideological criteria and attached linguistic significance are responsible for the
change in status or the role materials play in our lives, and for all the
metaphysical dimensions we bring to the lives of objects (Cragg in Celant
288). These are the aspects of our relationship with objects that Cragg
addresses in his art. The following themes are important in his work: the
division between natural and manmade materials; the contrast between old
and new materials; what are considered as useful, valuable materials and
objects versus the dassification of others as rubbish; utilitarian pragmatism
versus aesthetic adornment; old artefacts with a romantic 'aura' and the
'banality' of contemporary products.
Cragg, therefore, sees the necessity to remodel our productive and
consumptive relationship with the physical world with a view to remodelling our
thought. He employs various strategies to achieve this change. Choosing
art, or sculpture, because it falls outside of the 'utilitarian pO'Ner system'
(Cragg in Celant 268), he describes the artist's role as mixture of objectivity,
subjectivity and irrationality. These three levels of engagement or intervention
are present in varying proportions in all Cragg's creative endeavours. He
maintains that the intervention of institutions that take control of our production
and consumption, constitutes the source of our bad relationship with objects
and has to be transcended in order for us to get to their poetic, metaphysical
and mythological dimensions (Cragg in Celant 268).
In one respect intervention is material and physical and indudes the level of
technology used to make an artefact. In another respect, intervention refers to
the acknowledgement of the effect of the human intellect on the world,
reflecting on things and allocating semantic value. The semantic value 'Ne
assign in this process is a new attribution, an alteration at the level of thought
and language. There is also intervention as 'erotic appreciation' or a poetic
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response to the world, expressed as a vocabulary of metaphors. Cragg's
simple statement that real freedom exists only 'betvveen our ears', is a
reference to a universe of thought and imagination, the source of 'erotic' or
poetic appreciation and the matrix for the invention of a new dense,
metaphoric vocabulary with which to express these responses (Cragg in
Celant 25). It is comparable to Vico's 'poetic logic' and Ricoeur's 'iconic
augmentation'.
The arena where change in our relationships can and must take place is
language, in that we allow linguistic categories to dominate our relationships
but can use it to effed change and reacquaint us with our visual surroundings.
We also allow second-hand, pre-digested and regurgitated images and ideas
or media presented realities to curtail our freedom. This 'institutionalised'
nature of our relationship to things, that is, what our cultural system, as a
categorising power, imposes on our environment, is a source of major concern
for Cragg (Cragg in Celant 268).
This concern provides the impetus for his approach. His aesthetic strategy
begins from a kind of simulated primordial position, and as much as possible
Cragg distances himself from cultural norms and tyrannies in order to gain a
space in which to pradice intelledual and emotional freedom. Although he
dra\\'S on contemporary scientific methods for investigating the empirical
world, his starting point seems to recall the pre-Socratic philosophers'
questioning mode. His approach also recalls the games of childhood
exploration. I describe his approach as construdive play, a concept I will later
come back to in discussions of my own 'NOrk. Ricoeur discusses play as part
of the process of aesthetic meditation whereby 'the seriousness of a utilitarian
preoccupation where the self-presence of the subjed is too secure' is removed
(Ricoeur 1979 : 90). In his 'NOrking methods, Cragg does appear to want to
disrupt the sense of security of our defined relationships with the world and
precipitate a state of suspended reality.
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The most significant aspect of Cragg's strategy is the requirement that cultural
artefacts or events are not his creative starting points. He comments: 'the
impulse comes directly from my observations and experiences in the 'NOrld
around me and rarely results out of literature or cultural history' (Cragg in
Celant 72). Concerned with the idea of the possibility of achieving an
elemental knowledge of things and their connections to other things in the
'NOrld, he describes his approach thus:
.. ,the need to know both objectively and subjectively more about the
subtle fragile relationships between us, objects, images and essential
natural processes and conditions is becoming critfcal. It is very
important to have firstorder experiences - seeing, touching, smelling,
hearing - with objects and images and to let the experience register
(Cragg in Celant 62).
Cragg's early phase of 'NOrk as a student, first at Wimbledon School of Art
(1968 - 72) and then at the Royal College of Art (1973 - 77), reflected this
primal level of questioning and empirical investigative approach. The 'NOrk
from this period survives in the form of photographic records of a series of
interactions with the immediate environment, consisting of ~playful and
sometimes exploratory encounters with materials, environments and objects.
Thus his early approach to artmaking was not aesthetic or craftsmanlike in the
traditional sense. The results are not artefacts, nor are they representational
images. They cal be more aca..rateIy desaiJed ac; e>cperimerdal interventions in the
form of simple physical acts such as knotting string and draping it over
everyday, functional spaces and ordinary objects, such as a 'NOrk desk,
changing our sense of their purpose (fig. 1,1969). One example of a 'NOrk
shows an arrangement of natural and manmade materials and objects
collected from a beach and placed within the squares of a grid chalked onto
the slabbed concrete remains of old World War T'NO beach defences (fig.2,
1970). A small series of photographs show the artist, whose body is used to
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give the shape and pattern to a sequence of small white beach stones (fig.4,
1972). In another self-portrait the artist stands silhouetted on a beach next to
a line drawing scratched in the sand and mirroring his cast shadow (1971).
Another '\NOrk shows a stretch of shoreline with a series of numerical
characters on the sand, fashioned out of local seaweed, like orderly beach
detritus (1972).
In these '\NOrks Cragg is the playful catalyst that transforms our sense of the
locations and the materials he finds and presents, organised and reconstituted
in unpredidable ways. The element of constructive play in his exploration and
manipulation of the materials and objects, is finely balanced by his ostensibly
logical, constructive documentary procedure.
Cragg's employment as a science laboratory technician before enrolling at art
school, must have had a bearing on the resemblance of his procedures to
scientific methods for empirical data gathering, such as observation,
categorising, classifying, combining and documenting. This approach is
particularly evident in an early '\NOrk in which he placed a series of found
objects in sealed plastic bags like a collection of forensic samples (fig.3,1970).
Other '\NOrks from this period appear to experiment with and test basic laws of
physics, such as the stacked and balancing pieces, some of which include the
artist as an essential element in the structure (fig.5,1973). In doing these
experiments Cragg also shows his awareness of art as an activity in an arena
free from the laws of logic that pertain in other fields of inquiry, much like play
and games have metaphorically designated areas outside of reality with their
own rules of engagement.
Cragg's phenomenological approach was a reassessment of certain traditional
and conventional attitudes, what Cragg considered to be relatively
unquestioned criteria towards materials in art as well as industry. Perhaps the
most important of these questions, which resulted in a major and constant
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theme he continues to explore in his work, is the nature of the boundary
between natural and man-made or synthetic materials and the hierarchy of
value we place on things. This assessment meant questioning the value
placed on things, the ostracising of objects and materials by imposed generic
terms, or their manipulation by consumerism and utilitarianism (Cragg in
Celant 268). His strategy here was to continually cross this boundary, initially,
in his selection, use and treatment of materials in unorthodox ways and also in
the subtle references made to the traditions of technology.
The mid-seventies, his final years at art school, saw an intensification of this
experimental phase. These experiments may have begun as physiological
inquiries of the material world, as a gestation period, but they were also laying
down philosophical foundations, leading to the questioning of certain themes
and conceptual models (and evocations prompted by the materials
themselves). Cragg often comments about the place of objects, both natural
and man-made, in our lives and experience (Cragg in Celant 1998). Our
encounters with things like stones, plastic and wood, initially register their
physical characteristics, but all these substances and objects evoke strong
association and significance on other levels. Natural materials, by virtue of our
much longer relationship with them, generate what Cragg calls a 'balloon of
information' in language and thought, containing the metaphysical qualities we
bring to them - their history, mythological association, meaning and aesthetic
value (Cragg in Celant 288). We still need to forge this kind of relationship
with new things produced by contemporary technology, however, for example
plastic and other synthetic materials.
Another contrast Cragg explores, is that between old and new materials and
our very different intellectual and emotional response to them. Stone, iron and
bronze have a very long history in the world and, they in turn represent ideas
about progress, civilisation and value, before we even consider them in their
current role in production. In contrast our relationship with newer materials,
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plastic and polyurethane for example, has its origins in economic pragmatism
and consumerism. These synthetic materials, usually substituted for natural
materials, are regarded as inferior or merely utilitarian because of their
banality and shear abundance in our lives. According to Cragg, this lack of
depth in our relationship to these materials and objects results in irresponsible
and manipulative attitudes in which there is a sense that they are somehow
un'NOrthy of carrying metaphysical or poetical meanings in the way older or
natural materials do (Cragg in Celant 134). They don't contain romantized
associations and metaphorical meanings.
Cragg seeks to rehabilitate these materials from categories of thought and
language in which they are trapped. This rehabilitation of materials is an
example of a much more profound revolution, perhaps of consciousness
towards matter and towards ourselves as part of the material 'NOrld. Cragg's
personal contention is that the practice of art can humanise and interpret
models for understanding the universe, such as those provided by
contemporary quantum physics as \Veil as the earlier Newtonian models
(Cragg in Celant 172).
To discuss Cragg's sculpture within the aesthetic tradition of materials such as
clay, marble, and bronze used in the past as a representational medium,
means to question the idea of their use in the illusionistic representation of
existing objects of our experience. In traditional representational sculpture the
materials are vehicles, containments for the enhancement of ideas and
images. Cragg's sculptures re-examine this traditional marriage of material,
image and meaning, and although he is not the first to do so, as stated earlier
his motivations appear to stem from a need to survive a 'NOrld where empathy
is reduced to material progress.
The 'NOrks from this second early period still revolved around the immediate
studio environment, and a few excursions further afield, such as the Isle of
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Wight and Wales. These locations were not, however, anecdotally or
representationally reflected in the content or references in these works,
although this occurs in a later series. The pieces were not so much images
recalling experience as the results of certain physical interventions with
materials and objects, subjecting them to disintegrating processes such as
crushing, smashing, slicing and cutting. These actions were matched by
reconstituting procedures such as piling, inter-stitching, and stacking. The
works from this phase were notably untitled or otherwise factually descriptive
further drawing attention to substances and action rather than any referential
or metaphorical content beyond this (fig. 5, 1973).
The choice of materials, although still quite random (collected en route to and
from home and stUdio), became increasingly considered when they were used
in the works. As a result the works become more discursive, addressing
issues and themes beyond their physicality. They stur, however, remain
playful. Two works, emblematic of this period, are Crushed Stone (fig. 7) and
Large Stacks (fig. 6). They display diametrically opposed techniques typical of
this phase of Cragg's development, both of which make use of low technology
but show subtle references to a refined artistry in their colours and contrasting
textures. The stacks come close to being referential, or rather, metaphorical
images, and can be read as storage deposits, analogous to geological strata,
the crushed stone having a kind of primordial reference to elemental matter.
Cragg's searching, questioning phase gradually yielded further breakthroughs.
A series of 'Mlrks began to take precedence in which Cragg used vast
collections of mostly plastic debris from various sources, the remains of
production and consumption. Initially Cragg grouped this 'stuff' simply in terms
of their natural colour categories, and retaining a minimal approach, did
nothing obvious to alter their physical condition. The first important example
that he exhibited was New Stones, Newton's Stones (fig. 9, 1979). This work
consisted of small bits of plastic debris spread out, in a highly considered way,
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on the floor in a large rectangular shape. They are gradated in terms of
primary and secondary hues and subtle tones. An almost identical work made
immediately prior to this was Spectrum (fig. 8, 1979), in which the plastic
objects are larger but the colours are equally subtly gradated. New Stones,
Newton's Stones, appears to authenticate these plastic fragments, placing
them on the same archetypal footing as rocks and wood, and perhaps also the
crushed rubble, occupying psychological as well as physical space.
Using the same materials and formal characteristics Cragg began introducing
imagery in further works from this phase. The initial source of these schematic
images were things Cragg randomly found among the collected plastic
fragments - a toy aeroplane, a plastic 'Redskin' warrior, a moon-shape and so
forth (fig. 10). These tiny objects were templates for huge floor pieces that
mirrored their shapes, but their presence was altered into an image that had to
be reconstituted in the process of reading and associating. These floor and
wall pieces were almost pictorial and painterly in appearance and the images
included great variety and subtlety of form, colour and texture.
This series of fragment works began including more images and references
such as figures, national flags, vacuum cleaners and plastic containers, things
incidental to a wider range of Cragg's experience and environment. Cragg
began more consciously to expose the limitations of names, territorial
occupation and utilitarian categories of materials and objects. He makes
subtle references to classification and addresses topics such as colour theory
in New Stones, Newtons Tones (1978), cultural stereotypes in Redskin (1979)
and The Streets Are Full of Cowboys and Indians (1980), and national identity
in 8 Flags (1980) and Crown Jewels (1981) and Britain Seen from the North
(1981). The titles for the works were much more thematic as well as gently
capricious.
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The range of found fragments later broadened to include whole volumetric
objects, such as vehicle tyres, plastic buckets and furniture parts, and other
materials such as "wood, metal and rubber, virtually anything that had been
used in some prior capacity. One of his earliest of a series of free-standing
assembled volumetric pieces, was a 'NOrk called Mortus and Pestal (fig.
13,1985), a humorous example of found objects being used to construct a
secondary group. This giant image is configured out of clearly recognisable
and unaltered plastic, metal and \YOOden things cast out from our daily lives,
including bits of drain pipe, machine parts and empty tin and plastic bottles.
Cragg's technique in these 'NOrks was to use thought, reflection, selection and
placement, and the ordinary potential in these objects, to invent something
new in the wake of the old. Cragg never entirely discards the object's previous
life, but conceives a new grandeur for it we have overlooked because we are
so constrained by our utilitarian habits.
In this phase technological intervention was still minimal. In the early eighties
Cragg begins a series of landscape assemblages, using more construction,
such as building very simple 'NOoden structures out of veneered particle-
board. Notably in these 'NOrks, he begins combining natural stone, lava and
granite with man-made functional items, especially furniture (fig. 14). It is
sometimes hard to tell what has been physically altered or added to by Cragg
in these 'NOrks and what has merely been used in its found state. Stone is
occasionally cut, minimally shaped and representational, and sometimes used
as it is found in a weathered condition. These 'NOrks, some of which resemble
clusters of houses like Shed and Village (1984 - 5), and Evensong (1984), came
closest to representing the idea of pictorially organised whales in the sense of
. traditional landscape imagery, although Cragg refrained from over-manufaduring
them as artefacts. Biman Wood (fig. 14, 1985) an installation of a group of all
manner of diverse, functional object from large furniture, canaete mixers,
suitcases and watering cans, is simply uniformly covered in a film of tiny
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plastic fragments, transforming their familiar form into a soft, harmonious and
uniform panorama. These works introduce a narrative and somewhat emotive
element or evoke journeys and memories of places, evident in works like
Silent Place with Dwelling (1984), and Shore Landscape (1985).
The final phase of Cragg's work I discuss, representing a significant
development in his strategy, is the cast works that are manufactured of
plaster, iron, steel, aluminium, bronze, glass, ceramic and polyurethane.
Cragg comes full cirde in relation to the processes of traditional sculpture.
The work from this phase shows a high degree of technological skill and
control and the materials are traditional to sculpture as well as to industry.
Cragg embraces artifice but he also acknowledges the grand simplicity of less
self-consciously artful industrial technical skill, evident in cast iron and steel
industrial structures and vessels, bringing them into the domain of aesthetic
cultural production. The objects he bases his sculptures on have an
unquestioned raisen d' lttre in their sphere of use. Their transient conceptual
domain is gently invaded by Cragg's willingness to carefully think his way
through the world, and its objects and materials and to use them to invent an
intensified language and vocabulary.
I am looking for associations, images and symbols which could enrich
and enlarge my vocabulary of responses to the wor1d I see and even
function as thinking models. (Cragg cited in Lampert 34).
The cast works achieve a majestic presence not as representations but as
iconic fictive objects leading to 'dreams, to fantasy, and to speculation' (Cragg
in Celant 316). The works, as objects, establish a space for themselves in
time and place (figs. 15 and 16). As forms of life, they come to represent a
primary state of existence in relation to other things in the world. Their
presence owes more to conversions in our thought and language than to the
result of some physical or technological act of intervention on the part of the
artist. It is not the material that undergoes change, but our expectations of the
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materials. Cragg offers us a new attribution in the relationship between
subject and object.
As fictions, forms of life, these YJOrks have evolved, gestated, mutated and
'earned their place' in the 'tWrld and demand 'a dialogue on the basis of all the
other things that are in the 'tWrld' (Cragg in Celant 142). Even as a sculptor
Cragg's interest in objects and materials reaches beyond aesthetics in the
usual sense. This ontological demand is stated in his desire to 'make objects
that don't exist in the natural or in the functional YJOrld', and to use sculpture as
a means, on a par with scientific and philosophical investigation, to observe
and refled on the 'tWrld, to inform and transmit, both information and feeling,
and to bring real insight. He feels that the role of the artist/philosopher, in
humanising the statements made by scientists, and interpreting their
significance for the benefit of others, is equally groundbreaking. In the context
of statements about the YJOrld made by science and art, Cragg has said, 'I
think you have to make images of objects which are like thinking models to
help you get through the YJOrld' (Cragg in Celant 172).
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CHAPTERS
The Virtual Structure of Representation: Fictive Presence
The Work of Isabella Quattrocchi
There is a kind of river of things, passing into being, and Time is a
violent torrent For no sooner is each seen, then it has been carried
away, and another is being carried by, and that, too, will be carried
away.
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations.
In this final chapter I give an interpretation of my VIIOrking practice, primarily the
activity of drawing. I discuss the origins of a particular cycle of VIIOrk begun
after a long period of disengagement from artmaking, following a personal
trauma. Obviously, this retrospective view of the generative stages of my
VIIOrking practice and drawings is intervened by the distortions of memory, but I
do not make any claims to absolute interpretations of the process and in this
respect this discussion can be characterised as an indeterminate meditation.
Therefore, while I do set out to place this understanding of my working
process within the traditional debate concerning the nature of perception and
cognition and conflicting paradigms of knowledge, I do not attempt to place
this description of my practice within a specific aesthetic tradition.
The works under discussion are explored as the results of a state I describe as
cognitive disruption, stemming from psychic and emotional upheaval.
However, far from seeking coherence as a means of recovery, these
conditions were perceived to provide routes to modes of cognition conducive
to discovery, restructuring and invention, and eventual reorientation. The
initial dis-engagement from empirical experience and retreat into an interior
world resulted in the conditions of perception, as much as it is possible to do
so, without the intervention of a reflective consciousness. Drawing, through its
kinetic and changeable nature, enabled me to explore this psychic gap and
state of non~ngagementas a source of invention. When I resumed making
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drawings, the suspension of logic was the condition for a metaphoric response
to the world. I identify this resumption of artmaking with recuperation and
describe this state of mind as a preconceptual engagement with the world, not
unlike that of preliterate childhood.
I have previously described drawing as a mythic activity, as the dialectic
between gestural mark and cognitive deciphering in order to make new worlds.
The equation of the poetic and mythic with the so-called child-like 'primitive'
has often been cast in a negative light (Danesi 1993 :65). This view is upheld
within the philosophical debate, between rhetorical expression and rational
expression discussed earlier. This debate is itself embedded in the history of
objectivity and reason in science as perceived to be continuously undermined
by the opposing history of myth, metaphysics and poetic thought. The
imaginative faculty and its resultant metaphoric or poetic expression is thus
regarded as a negative intervention in processes of perception and
epistemological endeavour.
As discussed in earlier chapters, theories and ideas that run counter to this
bias against poetic perceptions of the world and their expression as metaphor
- the belief that they at best make only an ornamental contribution to
knowledge - have only relatively recently been expounded in the literature on
cognition.
The role of metaphor in this debate was also discussed in earlier chapters.
The theories significant to this present discussion are Vico's and Ricoeur's
theories of metaphor. For Vico, metaphor is a structuring feature of cognition
responsible for symbolic expression that in turn orientates us in the world. In
Ricoeur's theory metaphor fuses image and meaning in expression and
metaphoric attribution plays a pivotal role in cognition and creativity. I discuss
Ricoeur's and Vico's ideas to support certain interpretations I have of my
working practice.
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Although I have identified roughly three phases in my work for the purposes of
this discussion, they are not meant to reflect a strictly linear development. A
schematic model of the process materialised in the work more accurately
corresponds to a cyclical spiral in which ideas and images are recycled and
reconstituted. The earliest phase deals with the preconceptual response to
both the activity and the symbolic language of drawing and the accumulation
of textures, calligraphic marks and iconic images that formed the foundational
matrix of the early drawings as well as the later works. The earlier works are
described as compounds, derived from inventories of images, with the
appearance of narrative structure and content (figs. 17, 18 and 19). The
second phase identifies drawings in which certain dialectical issues are
realised through possible interpretations and readings of their surfaces (figs.
20,21,22 and 23). The third phase concerns a discussion of the extension of
the idea of drawing to the use of certain uncustomary materials, supports and
presentations (figs. 25, 26 and 27). First, I want to make some general
comments about aspects of drawing which have a bearing on the ensuing
discussion.
As an activity, drawing is a means of simultaneously making and reading
marks. This generalised description serves to narrow my focus to two aspects
of drawing which are most important in my work. First, there is the kinetic,
calligraphic and material aspect of making marks on a surface, and second,
there is making analogies and reading the manifest syntax of marks and
spatial surfaces of the drawings and inferring an image, syntax of images and
possibly a meaning.
Richard Wollheim, in his book Art and its Objects (1980), has used the terms
'seeing as' and 'seeing in' for describing this perceptual and cognitive
procedure. He distinguished these terms as involving different intentions. The
term 'seeing as' attends to the properties that are presented, the rationale
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behind the representation of something, whereas 'seeing in' is looking at what
is circumstantially present, like marks or patches on a damp wall, in order to
perceive something unintentional. Wollheim's account, however, separates
two perceptual and conceptual domains. The freedom of projection and insight
involved in looking at marks on a damp wall in 'seeing in' is not required in
determining a pictorial representation with its intention of a correct
reciprocation between artist and viewer and the correspondence between the
drawing or painting and the depicted subject. Consequently, the material re-
enactment of experience, in the case of drawing its graphic momentum, is not
a primarily significant factor in reading a vvork and making sense of it. The
question arises; to what extent do drawings provide the 'open' conditions for
interpretation? I discuss deciphering drawings and their systems of meaning
in greater detail further on.
Critical to this discussion are the referential nature of drawings, their
constitutive visible marks and the nature of their reference to what is outside
their language of visible signs, and secondly, the sense, metaphorical or
otherwise, of the experience that is related by the structure of the vvork and the
meaning conferred on the vvork by the spectator, its semantic dimension.
As a means of representation, drawing poignantly encompasses the dialectic
between gesture and indelible mark, temporality and fixation, internal vvorld
and public world. Although the starting point of a work might be interiority, a
psychological vvorld, the expressed experience is made public through a
discourse of fixed visible marks. In the process of drawing, articulating
surfaces with lines, strokes and various marks, the artist is sometimes
engaged in constructing a legible surface. Philip Rawson calls this potential
legibility 'units of meaningful form' or a 'logic of linear connectives' that have a
symbolic relationship with experience similar to the marks that form calligraphy
in writing (Rawson 1969 : 125). Rawson refers to Chinese brush calligraphy
as graphic expression that is able to convey qualities outside of written text,
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metaphorical resonance built into the calligraphic conventions that convey and
retrace retinues cl associative images (Rawson 1969: 28-29). Drawing has a link
to Ytfitten text, Vttlich itsetf encompasses the aforementioned relationships of
impermanence and permanence, as thought, speech, sound and gesture fixed in
written \\Ord and grammar. Units of meaning in drawing (groups of marks), are
comparable to units of meaning in language (syntax). As a system of meaning, like
linguistic expression, drawings articulate a \\Or1d, but made up of visual not verbal
symbols. Dra-.Nings, v.1th their partiaJlar way of materially structuring and presenting
experience, establish a visual discourse. Rawson explains the process thus:
...a drawing's basic ingredients are strokes or marks which have a
symbolic relationship with experience, not a direct, overall similarity
with anything real. And the relationships between marks, which
embody the main meaning of a drawing, can only be read into the
marks by the spectator, so as to create their own mode of truth
(Rawson 1969: 1).
As discourse in the public domain the \\Of'k is reconfigured by a reader/audience.
The conditions of legibility are not determinate and depend on familiarity v.1th
conventions and the degree to v.tlich there is a correspondence v.1th a referent
Dra-.Ning, as a mode of discourse, may have certain strategies or intentions to assert
a certain 'reality' or make reference to reality in certain ways. This 'reality' can be
rendered in terms that are desaiptive, diagrammatic, topographical and so forth.
...the draughtsman's skill consists in being able to maintain contact
with his own associations of fonn and feeling and to shape his marks
and assemblages so as to evoke the appropriate analogy-responses
from other people
and that,
all the elements of the work should be shaped so as to evoke
detenninate responses. (Rawson 1969: 21).
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Visual verisimilitude in drawings generally requires the avoidance of ambiguity
and misinterpretation. This kind of representation implies a possibility of
commensurability with locatable, verifiable referents and accuracy of
description within a unified field. Referents may be present as recognisable
entities that act as signposts directing us towards actualities that can be
validated outside the 'NOrk (for example a portrait of a known individual).
Mimetic integrity, associated with this means of expression transcribes
empirical experience but inadequately expresses temporality, movement and
states of mind.
In Ricoeur's theory, metaphor is responsible, through the suspension of
ordinary reference to reality, for creating the conditions in which new
attributions can be assigned and new models of the 'NOrld made in the form of
a fictive 'NOrk.
Resulting from this process is a new understanding of the image in perception
and cognition, as bringing verbal (logical) and non-verbal (sensible) content
together in the notion of the icon, the matrix from which new meaning can
arise. This theory amounts to a fusion of t'NO modes of cognition traditionally
considered dichotomous (Bruner 1985). The context for this occurrence is the
fictive 'NOrk, the projected 'NOrld of the artist, a new mythos of reality. This
fictive 'NOrld is not a result of reproductive or descriptive reference to
experience but the result of iconic augmentation, a primordial reference
thro.ugh which the artist forms new worlds and new identities. The images of
the poet or artist are 'not only shadows or similarities, but ... offer new models
for perceiving the world' (Ricoeur 1979: 130 -131).
Ricoeur links the notion of the poetic image as icon with written characters
describing the invention of the phonetic alphabet in successive stages of
compression, as the condition for the power of expression to 'capture the
universe in a web of abridged signs' (Ricoeur 1979 : 132). Writing and
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drawings are iconic images that condense reality into a form that increases
their generative force. One can refer this idea back to the operation of a
metaphor as schema, a breeding ground or matrix for meanings and concepts.
The icon can be similarly understood as containing the generative properties
of a cipher, or a code that in certain circumstances is able to project a virtual
'NOrld of messages. The idea of a hologram might be an appropriate analogy,
a set of mysterious signs embedded in a form that is decoded and projected
as a three-dimensional image.
The production of, a projected fictive 'NOrld, however, is only one part of a
process. The projected 'NOrld of fiction is only realised and completed by the
presence of the 'NOr!< to an audience, the 'NOr!< addressed to someone. The
interpretation of the 'NOr!< by a vie'Ner is part of the construction of the 'NOrk.
This second significant aspect of Ricoeur's theory stems from his explanation
of the role of imaginative insight in the metaphoric process.
Ricoeur has said of interpretation that it concerns the potential for a 'NOr!< to
'disclose a 'NOrld' and for the vie'Ner/reader/audience to relate to the 'NOr!< in
terms of 'the kind of 'NOrld the text presents' (Ricoeur 1973 (a) : 86). The
'NOr!< is posited as a virtual presence upon which the audience acts by
appropriating meaning. Ricoeur makes it clear that appropriation is not
unravelling the inherent content of a 'NOrk. Like the insight into metaphoric
sense the vie'Ner apprehends meaning in the context and conditions provided
by the 'NOr!<. Ricoeur explains (speaking here of written texts): 'to understand
is not to project oneself into the text, it is to receive an enlarged self from the
apprehension of proposed 'NOrlds' (Ricoeur 1973 (a) : 87). I discuss my role
both as the maker (encoder) of fictive 'NOrlds and as the reader and interpreter
(decoder) of these 'NOrlds and the importance of this dual relationship in my
process of drawing and to the structure of the drawings.
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Drawing has always been my primary mode of expression, but I do not regard
it merely as a process of objective rendering. I describe the process as more
like gathering momentos, souvenirs of a journey made through memories and
emotions of being in the world. There is an element of play, in making the
work as well as reading it. Describing the world of the work of art as a playful
presentation, Ricoeur relates the condition of play to the suspension of
reference in metaphor and the state of 'non-engagement' created by fiction.
The condition of play, precipitated by the condition of fiction and the aesthetic
experience, 'is not determined by the consciousness 'Nhich plays; play has its
own way of being' (Ricoeur 1973 (a) : 90). Ricoeur borrows this theme from
Hans-Georg Gadamer's ideas in Truth and Method (1984). Play transforms
the protagonists in the aesthetic encounter with a fictive world - reality, the
artist, the work and the audience/reader. In play, the abandonment of
everyday reality to the poetic universe, leads to a 'new mode of being in the
world' (Ricoeur 1973 (a) : 96). This idea and the remission of control
correlates with the notion of preconceptual engagement with the world and
psychic disruption in my own work.
In the earliest phase of drawing, in the activity of covering paper with small
intense marks, I recognised an affinity to writing, the way our literate selves try
to give form to thoughts and psychic states. The illegibility of the graphic
marks and the way in 'Nhich they accumulate into images on the space of a
page, and alternatively digress or progress towards legibility stimulated an
awareness of the delicate nature of this illusion of logic that was created by a
group of lines and dots and how easily this borderline between understanding
and confusion could be transgressed. Thus the activity of drawing deals with
the problems of deciphering 'Nhat we are presented with in images and texts,
with understanding that is often inexplicable and that comes about through a
series of unique connections and insights. These insights are made in the gap
that is opened up in perception by metaphoric displacement.
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The idea of drawn marks appearing like script appealed to memories of
preliterate childhood. I have a strong memory of myself, as a small child, first
encountering and attempting to copy the letters and written exercises of my
older, literate sisters. There were pages of patterns I could not decipher which
I knew meant something, since so much attention was given to the activity of
repeatedly producing them. The activity of producing mysterious marks was
somehow aesthetically satisfying. The sense of mystery I felt then is similar to
encountering a foreign language script, which has more in common with the
visual marks of a drawing.
Drawing seemed to be a way of reconnecting with a lost pre-literate psychic
stage. Another example of this, is the transformation of the patterns of
meaning, linguistic, visual or auditory, when they are decontexualised and
desensitised through repetition (incantation) or rote. I am reminded of a form
of punishment I received in school which involved writing the same line
hundreds of times. The mechanical nature of this activity in the context of a
learning environment, resulted in a curious atemporality, what might be
described as a psychic gap. Words and sentences were emptied of all
meaning or reference turning the focus entirely onto the marks making up the
script, the visual pattern of repetition and the repetitive action of writing. I
encountered a similar state of suspension attending Catholic Mass as a young
child. The litany was conducted in Latin at that time, I think, and later, even
when English was used, I still did not focus on the meaning and followed the
proceedings because of the familiar repeated sounds and rhythms, like
incantations. These situations always opened a door into a conceptual no
man's land or mythic time and allowed a free flow of thoughts and ideas, like a
dreamtime.
The activity of drawing in such states takes precedence over an intentional
articulation or depiction and serves no purpose other than it might do when
doodling, the purpose the voice might serve in chanting, actions representing
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a dislocation between bodily action and consciousness. This was an accurate
reflection of my state of mind and this essentially undetermined approach has
by and large rema'ined as a generative part of my working practice and has
played a role in my method of drawing and in my choice of materials. I
describe it is as recording a flow and momentum of marks preceding thoughts
and images. This emphasis on the calligraphic momentum of drawing had a
direct influence on a series of drawings of water (figs. 23 and 24). These vvere
produced from recall of experience over an extended period, as vvell as on
site. The site in question was a river that I had extensive childhood familiarity
with. It was such that I could locate myself on rocks in the middle of flowing
water. The experience therefore was of a multifarious assault on the senses.
The experience was extraordinarily paradoxical. Everything was in motion and
iterative in nature but the effect was so mesmerising as to be almost
hallucinatory and resulted in a total temporal, mental and physical
disengagement. These drawings have become emblematic and continue to
be a source in my work.
Much later, what became challenging was allowing conscious awareness to
begin filtering the collection of fields of textures, shapes, calligraphic marks
and strings of emblematic images that I accumulated. The point at which I
became conscious of recurring images or a persistent attraction to certain
marks, objects, spaces and the relationships between them and the possibility
of a syntax of images and marks was not momentous but gradual. This
resulted in certain signs and images becoming iconic, and these still recur in
my work.
In this early phase of my work I did not deliberately choose metaphors for
objects, ideas or narrative sequences. The single emblematic images evolved
into constellations, accumulations existing in an indeterminate space or
medium (fig. 17). They formed into emblematic metaphorical compounds. In
these drawings to present emblematically is to present the thing' elevated
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beyond local incidental experience. The emblems are not particular instances
or circumstances, they are atemporal and can be present in the past and the
future, so they are without narrative process and must gain significance from
context and reiteration.
One of the first of these compounds is a work called Nocturne, a title it
received at a late stage of its evolution (fig. 18). It is one of the few works to
which I have given a title, something I decided to abandon because titles
interfered with the evolution and reception of the work. This work developed
from a collection of emblematic images into a temporal structure, that is, it took
the form of a series of images not unlike a sequence of stills from a film
spliced together. It represented a precipitation of thoughts, and as a
compound image could be added to indefinitely. This openness and possibility
for change and continuity is an essential requirement in all my work. The
drawings must have open edges increasing the sense that they could be
scrolled and extended both in time and space or joined with other images in
any order of precedence. The small emblematic drawings, which I continue to
make, are inventories of thoughts and emotions, little souvenir landmarks in a
mental topography that is constantly changing and evolving. Each image is a
momento of changing memories and circumstances. These singular images
and their configurations remain polysemic and require interpretation on each
encounter and in each new context. I regard all my imagery as
interchangeable and interdependent so I am able to reconfigure it in a number
of ways. No work is entirely new, and each should be able to combine with
another and spawn further combinations. Ricouer might say meaning and
intention are never fixed. Once a work is made its presence is dependent on a
series of unfixed references and appropriations and reaction to it is determined
by the experience of whoever is viewing it. Its relationship to other works that
might be in seen in proximity - in the studio or exhibition space - is part of its
evolution.
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As the maker of the \YOrk my own flow of responses will be subject to my
changing state of mind and the historicity of that state of mind and my
inventory of images which arise in relation to my responses to the \YOrks
themselves. The process is cyclical. If an image or \YOrk has an injunction to
myself as their initiator, this is proscribed by the polysemic nature of these
images as metaphoric compounds. Together with my anecdotal, cultural and
historical experience they form a matrix. Each image/momento contributes
within a configuration of momentoes.
The middle phase of my \YOrk I refer to as topographical in nature (figs. 20 -
24). In attempting to describe the fictive process of making these drawings, I
make analogies to certain activities in the real \YOrld of action. Marking out a
piece of blank paper in preparation for drawing or demarcating a space
resembles staking out an iconic territory parallel to real space, like the space
set aside for a game. The passage of time during the production of a drawing,
covering an area with marks, makes itself felt as out of real time, another
dimension, something like a film editor remaking time in the \YOrld of the film,
which runs parallel to real time and space. Moving a pen across the paper is
like traversing a space when walking slowly across the ground taking in
textures, surfaces and objects, like a recording camera. Walking in turn
induces thoughts about the act of reading a drawing, traversing its designate~
space and topography.
The dravvings are a collection of potentialities. The surfaces in certain examples
(figs. 20 and 21) are the only visible record of a path of though~ something
that can be returned to as a way of revisiting lost actions, observations,
moments and presences. The main pieces discussed consist of a series of
large, unframed and freely hanging drawings on paper (figs. 20 - 23). They
are topographical in this sense of prOViding a record of a mental terrain. Even
this revisitation is never a stable experience because the matrix of
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accumulated images, surfaces and associations are obscure and there are no
clear entry and exit points in these drawings.
Several metaphorical connections are made in both literature and visual art,
between activities involving movement - like walking, climbing, driving, writing,
drawing - and consciousness or a journey of psychic importance. This
emblematic image of projection into space and time is also closely connected
to the archetypal journey or quest so prevalent in classic allegory. The
emblematic topographical imagery associated with this journey appears as
paths, roads, rivers, deserts, forests and mountains often in the form of
labyrinths in which to find or lose oneself.
In each confrontation the work is experienced as a different configuration.
Interpretation becomes a metaphorical journey in itself, bringing to mind the
notion of contour maps, which become obsolete even as they are being made
because no part of the represented topography of the earth remains static.
Drawing is then perceived as an attempted retrieval of what is lost, of
refashioning what are reduced to the vagaries of memory and a record of the
mythic activity of recording and presenting a world, fixing it as an image.
Drawings attempt to become maps of understanding what is disappearing
forever. Reading them might be acts of renewal.
In many of the drawings (figs. 23 and 24), the grids that are a part of the
surface matrix are a reference to literal marking of space and time in various
contexts; in drawing this is often customary when transferring an image from
one space and scale to another; the value of space on the sheet of paper is
given equal emphasis by the grid. Metaphorically, they are also a reference
to codes of control and order, attempts to apply co-ordinates to temporality,
co-ordinates for the scanning eye following the original movement of the mark.
They can encourage a viewer to scan the surface rather than look at the
drawing as a whole, framed object or image, and thereby re-enact movement
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and change and refer to extension. The drawing must continually deliver its
implied presence, its implicit and explicit aspects. There is no definitive 'is' to
be discovered.
The layered surfaces, spaces and images read through other images,
encourage a similar continuity (figs. 20 and 21). Objects and motifs in the
drawings must exist as constantly shifting betvlleen legibility and illegibility, in a
limitless series of possible moments. There is no definitive affirmation of a
visual reality, only a decoding and deciphering involving the viewer's
encounter and what he\she brings to the work. In this way the drawing refers
but suspends the descriptive and encourages a metaphorical reference.
This description applies to the final phase of work consisting of a series of
large suspended installations made of a variety of materials (figs. 25 - 27). I
consider these to be an extension of the drawings done on paper and in their
general structure they are based on the idea of a hanging scroll. The materials
are used because of their fragile, diaphanous, changeable qualities, and
potential impermanence, including the use of growing grass (fig. 26). A sense
of continual change and restitution is important, and is expressed in the
unconfined structure of the work, the nature of the materials used, and in the
way the works are viewed. Like the previously discussed drawings on paper,
with their surfaces layered with superimpositions of overlapping images and
textures, both confusing the surface but also transforming it, this group of
works come into their 0'Nn in the exhibition space. Read through each other,
and appearing to overlay each other, ideas, images and analogies should flow
between them in a fluid manner and as much as possible, without a sense of
an ending.
The associative relationships and spatial dislocations are often the source of
psychic dislocations and new images. It is as if the image is able to change
while one is looking at it, during the act of deciphering when unique
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connections can be made, when one thinks that one recognises something
only to see it disintegrate and be persuaded towards another understanding.
This transience not only resides in the structure of the work itself, but it is a
catalyst for recognising this condition in ones own conceptual and emotional
makeup. I prefer vie\N8rs to have as little foreknowledge as possible before
encountering the works and do not supply any information such as titles or
lists of materials.
These works are meant to evoke presence without monumentality. The work I
did prior to this current cycle discussed in this study, was in its intention, more
closely related to the tradition of the static emblematic composition, the
'machine' of the unified pictorial space. In these works the compression of
narratives into significant representative moments, and the compression of
time into a single composed image required paradigmatic reading. The means
and method of making these works was also allied to the notion of
permanence, the idea of the museum piece preserved for posterity, the work
that can transcend history in its protected space of the museum.
Using the idea of a scroll in these current works is connected to the idea of
scrolls and books as containers and to some extent protectors of knowledge,
perpetuating the myth of origins and continuity. As containers the scroll and
book have a number of associations and references. The advent of the book
can be seen to mark a change in the relationship bet\N8en mind and nature,
the establishment of a new kind of space. It marks a point of departure from
submission to and being embedded in the flow of time. Time and space
converge in a book as in the history painting. Whatever is contained in a
book, gains an authority of transcendent presence over time.
Hovvever, the movement, mental or physical, required to work through a book,
implies a logocentricity of forward movement together with an expectation of
plot, a beginning, middle and end. In comparing scrolls and books significant
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differences are revealed. The book brings disparate material into a whole,
forcing the material to be viewed in a particular sequence, or at the very least
as related material, it requires opening and vvorking through the otherwise
hidden episodic contents, binding affirms permanent proximity of the contents
and finality.
With scrolls time is experienced as ramified. The experience is of diffused
spaces eerily fading and disintegrating, or emerging and forming. Parts of
scrolls can simultaneously be beginnings, middles and endings. In the
absence of linear movement there is no denouement. In the hanging vvorks
the transparent gauze is a matrix rather than a support in the usual sense that
paper supports the materials in a drawing. Drawn marks bond with paper so
thoroughly, the ink or colour settles in and becomes like a stain, a seemingly
permanent part of the surface. Ironically, in reality very often in old documents
it is the acid ink that eats the paper so that space occupied by the letters
disintegrates into a series of holes in the paper. The delicacy of paper, the
impermanence of live grass, and vvork that alters as you look at it over time,
engages with the myth of monumentality and permanence. These qualities of
the materials, in contrast with my earlier attempts to vvork within a tradition of
permanence and preservation, are a poignant reminder to me of loss and the
desire for permanence.
The vvork integrates the impermanent and transient, mainly the grass and
gauze pieces and the more permanent drawings on paper. These tvvo modes
of vvork require different energy and represent tvvo states of consciousness.
The impermanent is liberating and accepting, the permanent represents the
desire to record beyond the author and the moment. The impermanent vvork
. corresponds to disappearing speech, existing in memory or reiteration. The
experience of the exhibited vvorks is comparable to the transient visit to a
place that may elicit a desire for concrete memorabilia, souvenirs of the
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transient nature of experience. The two modes of \NOrk operate in a dialogue
between two different states of existing.
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Conclusion
The notion of renewal has been a constant theme in this dissertation and in
my own aesthetic strategies and those of Tony Cragg. This theme is reflected
in the dialectic - betvveen gesture and indelible mark, temporality and fixation
and the intemal and extemal YIOrld - that is in tum reflected in our relationship
as viewers with the fictive YIOrk of sculpture and drawing. Renewal often
arouses expectations of synthesis and foreclosure. Myths of synthesis and
foreclosure are confronted in these artistic statements, but the ontological
reality of sculpture and drawing, as fixed form, is ultimately subject to the
passage oftime and decay.
In this dissertation the stated intention was to examine the means by which
metaphor contributes to innovation and renewal in poetic expression. Gaston
Bachelard has described the poetic mind as 'purely and simply a syntax of
metaphors' (Bachelard in Gaudin 1971 : 32). The degree to which metaphor
contributes to innovation in thought and language depends on one's
adherence to a methodology of imagination. Ricoeur's study of metaphor, and
by extension poetic expression, can be understood methodologically, as ~
restitution of the faculty of imagination and its resultant images from its
association with sensory perception. The result of this restitution is an
understanding of imagination as 'a dimension of language' and consequently
as intimately linked with metaphor (Ricoeur 1974 : 318). Thus he comes to
metaphors' ontological power of redescription and its 'YIOrld making' role in
poetic discourse. Ricoeur goes so far as to assert that 'what is changed by
poetic language is our way of dwelling in the YIOrld' (Ricoeur 1973(b) : 85).
For the artists discussed, poetic expression as a means of suspending reality
and at the same time renewing connections with it, recasts their and the
viewers' way of being.
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In these examples of art metaphor exists in the gap bel'Neen seemingly
irreconcilable opposites and embraces the themes of time and loss. That
which is represented by the 'NOrks discussed, their images and materials,
reflects this distance as ambiguity. The viewer can freely enter the 'NOrld of
the work, the surface of a drawing, or the aura of the sculptural object, and
read illusionistic references into it, or accept the material as indecipherable.
This distance is the plight of the artisVreader and is made real in the pathos of
reading and construing. Understood in terms of the material nature of
artworks, this tension bel'Neen presence and absence takes on both a heroic
as well as a melancholic form; heroic because as makers artists constantly try
to reinstate their connection to the world through the material; melancholic
because their actions take place in a mythical zone. The suspension of
ordinary reality is also the suspension of time. We can begin to see the way in
which the desire for rehabilitation is continually deferred by the sense of
melancholy inherent in the metaphorical.
Yet these artworks seem to imply a task of commencement for the viewer, in
which the world of the work and the world of the viewer can be brought
together through the work. In Ricoeur's words 'the internal interplay within
works between the received paradigms and the production of gaps' is the
place where meaning is made by the reader (Ricoeur 1980 : 149). Both the
work and the audience are grounded in a history, firstly, at the formal level of a
language of signs, and secondly, at the level of experience. Yet the world of
fiction can project us beyond this, if only temporarily. Metaphor, in its
allegorical form, brings into prOXimity our experience of the world as a fiction
with other worlds of lived experience: physical, psychological or historical. In
the example of the drawn image, all the conventions we choose to understand
and accept as constituting a schematic presentation of time and space can
project us into new realms of experience. Drawings, as metaphors, are maps
referring us to other maps of the world. Their presentation, in the form of a
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recurring metonymy or a 'universe of abridged signs' (iconic augmentation),
attempts to counter the unfolding horizontal experience of time, the direction in
which we (in the West) are accustomed to reading text and listening to stories.
...everything happens to a man (sic) in this very moment of now.
Centuries and centuries, but events happen only in the present;
countless men in the air, on land and sea, and everything that really
happens, happens to me...
Jorge Luis Borges (The Garden of the Forking Paths cited in
Calvino 1999 : 242)
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